God is human : understanding human uniqueness in an evolving world by Newland, Matthew Allen
God is Human: 
Understanding Human Uniqueness in an Evolving World 






Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Arts (Philosophy) at 
Concordia University 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
March 2008 
© Matthew Newland, 2008 
1*1 Library and Archives Canada 
Published Heritage 
Branch 
395 Wellington Street 





Patrimoine de I'edition 
395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A0N4 
Canada 
Your file Votre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-40826-1 
Our file Notre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-40826-1 
NOTICE: 
The author has granted a non-
exclusive license allowing Library 
and Archives Canada to reproduce, 
publish, archive, preserve, conserve, 
communicate to the public by 
telecommunication or on the Internet, 
loan, distribute and sell theses 
worldwide, for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, in microform, 
paper, electronic and/or any other 
formats. 
AVIS: 
L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive 
permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives 
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, 
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public 
par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, 
distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans 
le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, 
sur support microforme, papier, electronique 
et/ou autres formats. 
The author retains copyright 
ownership and moral rights in 
this thesis. Neither the thesis 
nor substantial extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without the author's 
permission. 
L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur 
et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. 
Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de 
celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement 
reproduits sans son autorisation. 
In compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting 
forms may have been removed 
from this thesis. 
Conformement a la loi canadienne 
sur la protection de la vie privee, 
quelques formulaires secondaires 
ont ete enleves de cette these. 
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, 
their removal does not represent 
any loss of content from the 
thesis. 
Canada 
Bien que ces formulaires 
aient inclus dans la pagination, 
il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. 
Abstract 
God is Human: 
Understanding Human Uniqueness in an Evolving World 
Matthew Allen Newland 
This work defends the understanding that Homo sapiens is a unique species, bearing an 
ontological distinction that makes it different from other species of animal life. However, 
challenges from contemporary biology and evolutionary theory may offer us reasons to 
either abandon the idea of human uniqueness entirely, or else revise our understanding of 
what human beings are in light of the presence of intelligent behavior in other animal 
species. Over the course of five chapters, I attempt to understand human nature through a 
multidisciplinary investigation. I do this by considering theological understandings and 
ethical theories in addition to scientific facts, recognizing that the scope of each is up to a 
point limited to its own universe of discourse. Overlaps between each discipline, 
however, allow for a broader and more comprehensive understanding of human nature 
than employing only one discipline will allow. My goal is to provide an understanding of 
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Introduction. 
LI. The Questions to be Considered. The following thesis was written to address two 
questions. The first of them is whether or not human beings are unique from other forms 
of life in the world, possessing a "higher" kind of existence. The second question is how 
human beings are unique, if they possess a different sort of existence from other forms of 
animal life. Religious people, especially those of Judeo-Christian backgrounds, have 
always understood human beings to have been "uniquely created" by God. These views 
understand human beings to have been made in the image of God, as the book of Genesis 
tells us. These faiths also tell us that human beings participate in the divine life of God in 
a way no other living creature is capable. 
For human beings, it seems that human life in its present state is very different 
from the lives of other non-human animals, for a number of reasons. The intelligence of 
human beings distinguishes them, for example, and for many thinkers testifies to their 
resemblance to God. Yet other curious traits seem to set human beings apart from the 
rest of Creation as well. As the theologian Karl Barth once remarked, "What a pity that 
none of these apologists considers it worthy of mention that man is apparently the only 
being accustomed to laugh and smoke!"1 
Unfortunately, science has begun to challenge many of our reasons for 
understanding human beings to be unique. By identifying humans as Homo sapiens, a 
species of hominid among many other now extinct species, science has forced us to 
recognize the "animal nature of human beings".2 Evolutionary epistemologists have 
come to the understanding that the process of evolution is responsible not only for the 
1
 Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics. 11112. (Edinburgh: T.& T.Clark, 1960). 82. 
2
 By this I mean Homo sapiens' existence as both a kind of mammal and as a kind of ape, descended from 
and related to other species of apes. 
1 
existence of the species Homo sapiens, but also for the development of the species' 
intelligence, culture, and behavioral traits. Because of this, asserting that Homo sapiens 
bears any kind of divine nature or beginning becomes more difficult. 
Since intelligence, the development of language and artwork, and even drug abuse 
can be explained through evolutionary processes,4 then why should we believe Homo 
sapiens to be anything more than its animal ancestors and relatives? This thesis was 
written with the purpose of addressing these challenges. It was also written in order to 
find a way to continue to assert theological understandings of human nature, even in the 
light of contemporary scientific understandings. 
1.2. A Multidisciplinary Investigation. In order to justify the idea of human 
uniqueness in the face of biological science, I shall embrace a multidisciplinary 
understanding of human nature. What this means is that I shall recognize that different 
disciplines of study will have particular ways of investigating human nature, and will as a 
result find different answers to the question of what human beings are. Rather than 
"deify" one domain of inquiry over another, I will instead recognize that each discipline 
must be understood as separate but as equally valid as any other in its conclusions. While 
some disciplines, such as science and ethics, and ethics and theology, may actually 
overlap and up to a point share the same understanding, each will possess an 
understanding that cannot be overruled or entirely replicated by the understandings of any 
other subject. 
3
 van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. Duet or Duel; Theology and Science in a Postmodern World. (Harrisburg: 
Trinity, 1998). 143-145. 
4
 Diamond, Jared. The Third Chimpanzee: The Evolution and Future of the Human Animal. (1993; New 
York: Harper Perennial, 1993). 202-203. 
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Before I begin, I wish to say a few words about how the disciplines I consider 
shall be selected. I shall make the claim that science and theology stand as equally valid 
yet separate ways of understanding the world. Because I do this, I will likely face 
challenges from individuals who would place science before all other domains of inquiry. 
Consider the following quotation from Tom Regan, taken from his essay on animal 
rights: 
"Many people evidently believe that theological differences separate humans 
from other animals. God, they say, has given us immortal souls. Our earthly life 
is not our only life. Beyond the grave there is eternal life - for some, heaven, for 
others, hell. Other animals. Alas, have no soul, in this view, and therefore have 
no life after death either. That, it might be claimed, is the morally relevant 
difference between them and us. [... However,] the theology just sketched (very 
crudely) is not the only one competing for our informed assent, and some of the 
others (most notably, religions from the East and those of many Native American 
peoples) do ascribe soul and an afterlife to animals. So before one could 
reasonably use this alleged theological difference between humans and other 
animals as a morally relevant difference, one would have to defend one's 
theological views against theological competitors."5 
Regan forces us to recognize the sheer number of theological understandings of human 
life in order to question the validity of the one he summarized. 
However, theology is not alone in this; other disciplines, including science, hold 
within them rivaling theories and understandings about nature which at times conflict, 
even while being supported by the same evidence. Consider now the following incident 
discussed by biologist Tim White, regarding the difficulty of interpreting paleontological 
discoveries: 
"In the early 1900s, thousands of fossils from the western badlands flooded 
America's museums. Among them were the oreodonts - medium-sized pig 
5
 Regan, Tom. "Ill-gotten Gains." The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity, eds. Paola 
Cavalieri and Peter Singer. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 197-198. 
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relatives from 33.7 to 23.8 million years ago. Paleontologists named a multitude 
of oreodont species and inferred an adaptive radiation from the 'diversity' they 
created. [...] The early systematic exuberance of oreodont paleontologists is a 
textbook example of postmortem deformation driving the creation of invalid fossil 
taxa. Distorted oreodont crania were selected as type specimens for [separate 
species, depending on their flatness or narrowness]. But the fossils had been 
flattened and narrowed by geological deformation, not natural selection. 
Typological systematics had combined with postmortem distortion to create a 
diversity that proved chimeric."6 
It is White's purpose to show that scientific evidence is ultimately subject to human 
interpretation, which may lead to conflicting theories or mistaken understandings, even 
within the same discipline. 
J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, an evolutionary epistemologist whose thought shall 
prove to be pivotal to this thesis, goes even further with the bold suggestion that both 
theology and science are equally products of cultural evolution. For van Huyssteen, the 
cultural context in which an individual was raised determines both the scientific and 
religious ways he or she will come to understand the world. Therefore, what is rational 
for an individual to believe will depend largely on the cultural context in which that 
individual was raised and educated.7 What follows from this is that some theologies and 
some scientific understandings shall always seem more rational than others, depending on 
any person's cultural understanding of the world. 
I shall now offer an example of what is meant by this. The Yolgnu, a group of 
Aboriginal Australians, have developed in their culture a very different way of 
6
 White, Tim. "Early Hominids: Diversity or Distortion?" Science 299 (5615,28 March, 2003). 1994-
1997. 
7
 van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. Duet or Duel: Theology and Science in a Postmodern World. (Harrisburg: 
Trinity, 1998). 158-160. 
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understanding the physical world. In the following passage, science historian Margaret 
Wertheim tells us that though the Yolgnu insist that their knowledge is based on logic, 
"if Yolgnu knowledge is based around logic, it is of a definitively different sort to 
the Western variety. In our science, the logical underpinning is provided by 
numbers. Physicists, and to varying degrees scientists from other disciplines, 
attempt to explain the world using the language of mathematics. The Yolgnu 
system derives not from the symbolic use of numbers but from kinship. The 
name they give this kinship-based logic is gurrutu. [...] The parallel with maths is 
quite explicit. At the root of mathematics are the ten numbers, which traditionally 
arose from the naming of our fingers. In gurrutu, the basic elements named are 
not the fingers but the relationships between three generations of a family. To 
understand this, consider the family group of a husband and wife, their four 
parents and their eight grandparents. 
What is named is not the family places per se, but the relationships between them. 
[...] Altogether there are 16 relationships named in reciprocal pairs. And these 
form the basic elements of gurrutu. Since what is named is always a relationship 
between two people which points from one of them to the other, the elements of 
gurrutu could be seen in a sense as vectors. The system thus constitutes a network, 
or mesh, of relationships. [...] And just as scientists can use the language of 
mathematics to talk about things as diverse as the dance of the planets and the 
form of a leaf, so the Yolgnu can name everything in the world through the 
logical language of gurrutu."9 
This non-Western system, as a result, rests on a different set of symbolic elements, yet 
possesses its own rational and unique logic that allows for a consistent and reasonable 
explanation of the world.10 
As a consequence of this fact, it is possible to do more than accept the existence 
of conflicting theories within a single scientific discipline, based on the same pieces of 
physical evidence. It is possible and defensible to go even further, and recognize the 
existence and validity of as many possible scientific systems as theological systems. 
8
 Wertheim, Margaret. "The Odd Couple." The Sciences (March/April 1999). 42. 
9
 Wertheim, Margaret. "The Way of Logic." New Scientist (2 December, 1995). 38. 
10
 Wertheim's article goes on to explain how these personal relationships extend to places and even other 
nations of people. (Ibid., 38) 
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This means that Tom Regan could just as validly question the use of Western 
scientific methods in the study of animal nature, as he does the use of Western theology. 
Therefore, the cultural milieu of the multidisciplinarian determines the points of view he 
or she shall employ in order to investigate any object of study. 
1.3. A Personal Perspective. Having been myself raised in both North America and a 
Roman Catholic family, I have been brought up in a particular cultural context. As a 
result of this, I have been culturally conditioned to understand the world, and interpret my 
experiences in it, in a particular way. I understand both the world and my place in it from 
a Catholic perspective which has forced me to attempt to understand scientific and 
theological knowledge in the light of my faith. As a result, neither the understanding of 
nature described by scientific materialism, nor a fundamentalist religious perspective, 
offer satisfying explanations of the world. Either seems incomplete when considered 
alone. To accept one but reject the other also seems irrational to me, in light of the fact 
that neither science nor theology seems equipped on its own to explain all of the 
phenomena of the world, or all of my experiences in it. 
As a result of these personal facts, I shall address the question of human 
uniqueness from a Western, and specifically Christian, point of view. I do not consider 
myself qualified to explore the question from any other cultural perspective, for I lack 
sufficient exposure to the ways and beliefs of any other culture. Therefore, because I 
understand Western science and theology, I shall make use of both in order to answer the 
questions posed at the beginning of this introduction. 
6 
It should be noted, however, that it is in fact the views of Western science that 
seem to pose a challenge to the understanding of human nature held by Western theology. 
After all, Charles Darwin himself was an Englishman, and so was educated in a Western, 
Christian culture. As a result, my cultural restrictions should not interfere with my 
attempt to show the validity of the Judeo-Christian understanding of human uniqueness, 
while still accepting the theories of contemporary science. 
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Chapter One: Understanding the Meaning of Humanity. 
The purpose of this chapter shall be to examine briefly both classical and contemporary 
understandings of what it means to be a human being. This shall be done so that we 
might recognize the broad number of reasons why human beings are believed to be be 
unique. These understandings come from a number of different disciplines, and each 
understanding may as a result be very different from the others it is offered alongside. In 
other words, thinkers who consider the subject of human uniqueness often assert that 
humans are special for different reasons. Unfortunately, this raises the question of 
determining which understanding of human uniqueness is the most significant. In the 
sections to follow, different conceptions of human nature will be described, and the 
relationships of these conceptions will be considered. The question of the best way to 
understand human uniqueness will be considered, and in the conclusion that way will be 
briefly summarized. 
1.1. Aristotle: A Classical Conception of Human Nature. Traditionally, human nature 
has been understood in terms of Aristotle's conception, an understanding that continues to 
have life and influence through its incorporation into Thomism, and by extension, Roman 
Catholic theology. This section shall briefly explore Aristotle's understanding of 
humanity, noting both his recognition of its animal nature, as well as the aspects which 
distinguish it from other forms of animal life. 
Aristotle wrote that non-human animals "live by perceptions and memories and 
have little experience; but the human kind live also by art and reasonings".11 As a 
11
 Maclntyre, Alasdair. Dependant Rational Animals. (Chicago: Open Court, 1998). 5. 
8 
believer in teleology, the idea that everything in the cosmos acts toward attaining a 
particular goal, Aristotle believed that human beings were no exception. Humanity's 
goal, Aristotle claimed, was a politically organized society, for such a society afforded a 
state's citizens the best lives possible. 
Aristotle understood that human beings had to be recognized by the possession of 
attributes that allowed for a political life and social existence, and so was lead to 
conclude that speech was a necessary aspect of political and social life.13 Speech not 
only distinguished human beings from other animals, but it allowed for the discussion of 
such topics as justice and morality, key aspects of life in a political state. In order to be 
able to speak of such abstract concepts, a human animal would have to be rational, or 
able to think of goods and goals beyond those that would immediately satisfy the 
passions of the animal body the human being possessed.14 
To be a human being, in Aristotle's view, an individual had to use the powers that 
were unique to human beings in order to attain the goal human life was directed toward. 
In order to determine what powers these were, a simple comparison between other living 
things could reveal which capacities were unique to human animals. While plants were 
able to grow after being nourished, plants were not able to move or perceive their 
environments, animals were. Therefore, Aristotle understood there to exist a vegetative 
soul present in both plants and animals that gave each the power to live and grow, and an 
animal soul that allowed the organisms possessing it to move and respond to sensations 
12
 Trigg, Roger. Ideas of Human Nature: An Historical Introduction. (New York: Blackwell, 1988). 25. 
See Aristotle's Politics, 1252b. 
13
 Ibid., 25-26. Politics, 1253a 
14
 Ibid., 25-26., Politics 1253a. 
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of pain and pleasure. Human beings, Aristotle observed, also possessed each of these 
aspects, as their bodies were able to grow and move. However, human beings possessed 
a third kind of soul that could be produced only in their own kind: the rational soul, 
which allowed human beings to rise above the appetites that motivated the actions of 
unthinking animals.15 
Aristotle's understood the the universe to be eternal, without a beginning or end, 
and never changing. While individuals would grow and pass away, the species of 
animal living in the world were understood by Aristotle to be definite and everlasting 
kinds. The occasional mutation or "monstrosity" born to a particular kind of creature 
signified nothing more than a particular instance of distorted existence, and in no way 
heralded any sort of evolutionary development. The intended, perfect form of a species 
could not always be perfectly realized.17 This, Aristotle believed, was merely a 
consequence of the world's imperfection. Though individual creatures were born into 
the world but then died, the kinds of organisms being born would always remain, for each 
animal existed as it had been intended to exist, in order for nature to pursue its ultimate 
goal.19 
15
 Aristotle, De Anima. 414a 29. 
16
 van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. Duet or Duel: Theology and Science in a Postmodern World. (Harrisburg: 
Trinity, 1998). 43. 
17
 Clark, Stephen R. L. "Apes and the Idea of Kindred." The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond 
Humanity, eds. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 115. Clark 
notes that Aristotle ascribed a degree of imperfections to certain species as well, claiming that seals were 
"deformed quadrupeds ". 
18
 Smith, Justin E. H. "Imagination and the Problem of Heredity in Mechanist Embryology". The Problem 
of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Justin Smith. (New York: Cambridge, 2006), 82-
83. 
19
 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption., 338a. Aristotle describes change in the world to be cyclical, 
the individual substances within it both one day "coming to be" and presently " already come to be". 
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The views of Aristotle, Christianized during the Middle Ages, had a profound 
effect on the way the people of the Western world came to view themselves and their 
place in Creation. The understanding that only one species of animal was capable of 
being human lead to a conception that identified humanity with only one kind of creature. 
The notion that species were fixed categories in an unchanging universe fit well with the 
biblical understanding that 
"God made the wild animals of the earth of every kind, and the cattle of every 
kind, and everything that creeps upon the ground of every kind. And God saw 
that it was good." Genesis 1:25 (NRSV) 
If God's Creation was good, then Aristotle's understanding of unchanging kinds made 
perfect sense. The two ideas seem perfectly consistent. 
St. Thomas Aquinas accepted and adopted Aristotle's metaphysics and employed 
them to support the teachings of Christianity.20 Through doing this, he ensured the 
survival of Aristotelian thought, but allowed it to become the official voice of the most 
powerful body of people in his world. 
Aristotle's understanding of the human being as a rational animal would dominate 
European thought for centuries to come, underlying Western understandings of both 
cosmology and biology, his authority in scientific matters eroding only with the 
astronomical discoveries of Galileo in the 1600s, and geological advances of the 1700s. 22 
20
 Karkkainen, Veli-Matti. The Doctrine of God: A Global Introduction. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2004). 92. 
21
 Bitbol-Hesperies, Annie. "Monsters, Nature, and Generation from the Renaissance to the Early Modern 
Period: The Emergence of Medical Thought", The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern 
Philosophy, Ed. Justin E.H. Smith. (New York: Cambridge, 2006). 51. Bitbol-Hesperies's article notes 
that 16' century physicians continued to recognize Aristotle's vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls 
determined the development of plants, animals, and human beings. 
22
 Hill, Jonathon. The History of Christian Thought. (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2003). 145. 
11 
Aquinas's theological authority, on the other hand, continued its hold on Roman 
Catholicism, reinforced by the First Vatican Council and defended by contemporary 
theologians such as Karl Rahner. As a result, Aristotle's classical understanding of 
human nature prevails to the present day. 
1.2. The Context and Impact of Darwinian Theory. This section notes the advances 
in science which forced thinkers away from both Aristotelian and traditional Christian 
understandings of both humanity and the universe. The impact new scientific discoveries 
and theories had on theistic thinkers shall be noted, together with the rise of 
understandings of the world that saw no need to invoke God as any kind of cause. 
Considering these changes shall help us to better understand the new and revised 
understandings of human nature that were to follow in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. 
Eighteenth century discoveries in geology forced men of science to modify their 
understandings of the earth, its age, history, and the story of the life inhabiting it. The 
theories of such scientists as James Hutton and William Smith offered new 
understandings of the formation of the strata of the earth, painting a picture of a gradually 
forming and still unfinished world.24 Natural processes had laid the foundations of the 
earth, science was learning, and not an instantaneous creation by God; neither was the 
world God's finished masterpiece. The idea that the world was not made perfectly and 
timelessly by God, that it was just as subject to change as anything else, directly 
challenged the Aristotelian understanding that the earth was eternal. It also challenged 
23
 Ibid., 298. 
24
 Ibid., 239. 
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literal readings of the Old Testament, which described the world as being only a few 
thousand years old. The discovery of fossils found embedded in those layers of rock 
offered a further reason to doubt the bible. While it had once been easy to dismiss the 
bones of vanished species of creatures as casualties of Noah's flood, such an explanation 
no longer made sense in light of the fact that the remains of these creatures were being 
found in many different layers of rock, indicating that they had died at vastly different 
times. Such discoveries were to cause severe and lasting changes for both the scientific 
and the religious worlds, forcing either massive revisions of what was to be believed or 
driving the two completely apart.25 
The existence of the bones of creatures no longer living forced the development 
of new theories of natural history, and chief among these were the theories of 
catastrophism and evolution. While catastrophists such as Georges Cuvier asserted that 
the fossils in each layer of rock corresponded with great life-destroying disasters, 
evolutionists believed a continuous process connected the fossilized bones with the 
creatures living in modern times, as ancient animals gradually developed into ones more 
familiar to the eighteenth-century world.26 Neither of these theories were at the time of 
their conceptions seen to conflict with religious understandings of the world's creation. 
Some catastrophists, for example, speculated that each massive extinction presented God 
with an opportunity to "start fresh" with another act of Creation and a new array of living 
creatures, thus reconciling the seven-day Creation of the biblical narrative with a 
corresponding number of cataclysms and new Creations. Nevertheless, accepting either 
of these new theories would have still forced any Christian of the time to significantly 
25
 Ibid., 239. 
26
 Ibid., 239. 
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revise his understanding of the manner through which life came to exist in the world. 
The theory of evolution in particular appeared to demand the most compromise, 
especially in light of the implications it had on both human origins and human nature.27 
The most significant of the evolutionists was Charles Darwin, whose theory of 
natural selection provided an explanation of how evolution might have occurred, through 
a mechanism that failed to invoke God as a cause. The idea that random variations 
alone explained the diversity of life on earth, accumulating slowly over periods of 
millions of years, was significant for a number of reasons. 
First, it distinguished itself from such understandings as those of Aristotle and 
Aquinas by failing to resort to supernatural agents in order to explain the state of the 
living world. While Aristotle had included goal-oriented directionality as a motivating 
factor for all the life in the cosmos, and as Aquinas had understood God to be the ultimate 
cause of change together with the idea of directionality, Darwin understood natural 
processes of reproduction and survival to adequately explain the multiplicity of living 
90 
things in the world. 
Second, Darwin understood that the offspring of a creature only resembles its 
parents but is not exactly identical to them, and that the offspring of any creature's 
offspring will itself possess a similar but not identical nature to its own parents. This idea 
directly challenged the Aristotelian notion of "species essence". Because minor 
Ibid., 240. 
Ibid., 240. 
Trigg, Roger. Ideas of Human Nature: An Historical Introduction. (New York: Blackwell, 1988). 35. 
Ibid., 85-86. 
14 
variations distinguish individual creatures of every lineage, there can be understood to be 
no definitive examples of any particular kind of animal, and thus no essential nature. 
Third, connected with the second, Darwinism challenged the biological notion of 
species divisions. The legendary Oxford debate between Victorian biologist Thomas 
Huxley and Bishop Samuel Wilberforce was held not because of a perceived conflict 
between science and religion, but because Bishop Wilberforce was also an ornithologist, 
and was not prepared to abandon the idea that species groups were fixed classifications.31 
Fourth and most importantly, Darwinian theory challenged Aristotelian-
Thomistic, and other Christian notions of human uniqueness, through the suggestion that 
human beings arose through the accumulated chance mutations of lower forms of life, 
and that no supernatural explanation was necessary to explain human existence. One of 
the results of Darwin's theory was an end to the invocation of God to serve as a valid 
scientific explanation of natural phenomena and human nature. While even the deists of 
the Enlightenment had been content to invoke God as the cause of the universe and the 
source of its order, Darwin showed that a purely natural explanation could be 
satisfactory.32 
In short time, men like Thomas Huxley had acknowledged the undeniable 
resemblance human beings shared with the other great apes and had even accepted the 
idea that such creatures might in fact be their close relatives. In the eighteenth century, 
Carl Linnaeus went so far as to include human beings together with other apes in his 
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taxonomic classifications, dubbing the species "Homo sapiens". In the decades to 
follow, the "animal history" of humanity would begin to reveal itself through fossil 
discoveries, which would continue for the next two centuries. The nineteenth century 
discoveries of the Neandertal and Java Man (later identified as Homo erectus) revealed 
the existence of creatures very similar to Homo sapiens from over a million years before. 
Such discoveries offered compelling evidence confirming that other hominids similar to 
Homo sapiens had existed long before what had been previously believed. They also 
seemed to offered proof that, as Darwin suggested, modern humanity evolved from 
similar, yet still different, kinds of creatures. 
Though neither discovery was enough to present an accurate picture of human 
descent, as it is now believed that both the Neandertal and Homo erectus represent 
separate and extinct hominid lineages, they were together cause enough to assert with 
confidence that human existence was almost certainly a product of evolution. The 
existence of these other hominids also demonstrated that human history was far less 
simple than prevalent religious views of the time had up until then accepted. 
More recent discoveries in the field of paleontology have revealed at last a direct 
line of descent and development for modern human beings from a very different kind of 
ancestor, going back at least four million years. A path can be clearly traced from the 
meter-tall primate Australopithecus afarensis to later specimens which were of the same 
genus but of a larger size. The path may be traced from them to African specimens of 
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Homo habilis, a user of sophisticated tools, to Homo erectus, and finally, one million 
years ago, to Homo sapiens, the modern and most successful species of hominid.36 
Evidence further suggests that the other great apes of today, such as chimpanzees or 
orang-utans, shared a common ancestor with modern Homo sapiens up until five million 
years ago. Such discoveries have played a role both in answering questions about 
human history, as well as raising new ones about humanity's identity, in light of its 
animal ancestry and close relation to animals which continue to survive until the present 
time. 
Because of the undeniably animal nature of Homo sapiens, and science's 
acceptance of Darwin's explanation of how the species came to evolve, Homo sapiens 
cannot be considered to be of a wholly different nature than its other animal relatives. 
Homo sapiens must, if Darwin was correct, be recognized to be as much a product of 
evolution as any other species of ape, descended from the same ancestors and bearing a 
less discontinuous distinction than had traditionally been believed. This seems to 
sharply contrast the theological understanding that human uniqueness lies in its existence 
as an imago Dei (image of God), an existence granted to no other form of animal life. 
The Darwinian understanding of human uniqueness presented here may seem too weak to 
really be meaningful; if human nature has been already possessed by several other 
different species in the past, and if the physiological aspects necessary to exhibit human 
life could still yet evolve in other species of animal, then it might be wondered how 





How we understand human nature becomes important at this point. It is important 
for us to determine what capacities, attributes, and behaviors are essential for a uniquely 
human nature. If the species Homo sapiens is presently understood to be a human 
species, then an analysis of what traits and attributes define Homo sapiens will present us 
with an understanding of what it is to be human, a definition that can then be tested on 
species other than Homo sapiens. In order to do this, several contemporary conceptions 
of human nature shall be briefly considered, so that a satisfactory definition may be 
determined. 
1.3. Contemporary Understandings of Human Nature: Carl Sagan. This section 
shall examine a purely scientific understanding of human nature, as offered by 
astronomer and astrochemist Carl Sagan. Sagan's understanding follows the scientific 
acceptance of Charles Darwin's thought, as it assumes that both the world and human life 
developed through purely natural processes. Reviewing his understanding is important 
because, as an atheist, Sagan has no interest in theological conceptions of humanity. As a 
result, he makes no attempt to understand or describe the species Homo sapiens as in any 
way divine or ontologically distinct from other forms of animal life. 
In 1977 Carl Sagan published his famous book, The Dragons of Eden, which 
attempted to both explain the source of intelligence and the evolution of the brain of 
Homo sapiens. In a section of the book entitled On Human Nature, Sagan attempts to 
specifically define what sets Homo sapiens apart from the rest of the animal kingdom, a 
task which he performs after a careful analysis of the Homo sapiens brain, the systems 
and parts composing it, and what parts it shares in common with other animals. 
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Understanding capacities for particular kinds of behavior to be rooted in specific 
areas of the brain, Sagan discusses how behaviors beyond rudimentary survival functions 
can be traced to either the limbic brain system, which the species Homo sapiens and all 
other mammals share with reptiles, or the exclusively mammalian neocortex. Following 
the research of Paul MacLean, Sagan observes how the brain is understood to be layered, 
with each one of its composing systems stacked on top of another. He presents the idea 
that as evolutionary processes added new layers to the outside of a species' brains, new 
functions and behavioral capacities were acquired by the organisms in possession of 
them.39 
Sagan tells us of how the brains of vertebrates vary in the number of systems 
comprising them, depending on the evolutionary complexity of the creatures possessing 
them. The most primitive vertebrates, fish and amphibians, possess only a rudimentary 
brain structure called the neural chassis, comprised of the top of the spinal cord, the 
medulla, and the pons. It allows only for the performance of simple, life-sustaining 
behaviors such as breathing. 40 
Reptiles, Sagan says, possess a brain comprised of two systems, the first of which 
is the neural chassis, which they share with fish. On top of the neural chassis reptiles 
possess the reptilian complex, which allows for more complicated behaviors (aggressive 
and territorial behaviors among them).41 
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The number of layers increases with mammals, whose brains are composed of at 
least two systems in addition to the neural chassis. The first of these is the reptilian 
complex, while the second is the limbic system. Sagan tells us that the limbic system is 
responsible for generating emotion, as well as basic altruistic behavior.4 
Higher mammals, such as primates, possess at last the most recently evolved brain 
system, the neocortex, which in Sagan's own words contains "our capacity to be 
human".43 He notes, for example, that the temporal lobes of the neocortex allow us to 
understand spoken words, while its frontal lobe allows for the experience of both 
anticipation and anxiety, and thus an ability to fear the future.44 
If such an understanding of the brain is correct, Sagan says, then "we should 
expect the reptilian complex to be in some sense performing dinosaur functions still, and 
the limbic cortex to be thinking the thoughts of pumas and ground sloths."45 However, 
Sagan notes that as evolution expands both the brain and the systems composing it, the 
physiology of the original systems is to an extent also altered.46 He also notes that a 
number of brain functions come to be shared between more recently evolved parts of the 
brain and where they were based originally. The olfactory sense is a prime example of 
this, as Sagan notes that while smells are primarily processed by the brain's limbic 
system, this sense may still take place in the neocortex, though to a much lesser extent.47 
He thus notes that in spite of the redundant occurrence of certain capacities, the older 
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brain systems underlying the neocortex of higher mammals continue to work as they did 
in the brains of their more primitive ancestors. As a result, the brain can be schematically 
understood to be comprised of a number of distinct systems each capable of performing 
different functions, ranging from breathing and growth to abstract reason. 
It is interesting to note the similarities between Sagan's presentation of the brain 
and Aristotle's view of the soul. More specifically, it might be said that the systems of 
the brain could be understood to be formed different aspects of the Aristotelian soul.48 
To begin, though neither is describing exactly the same object, the function of the neural 
chassis is roughly analogous to Aristotle's vegetative soul, as both allow the creature 
possessing them to grow and live on the most basic level. As it has been noted already, 
the reptilian complex contains the capacities for aggressive behavior, while both the 
senses and emotional behavior are rooted in the limbic system. The brains of creatures 
composed by these two systems could be thus understood to exist as a comprised unity 
that functions very much like Aristotle's sensitive, or animal, soul. Last of all, the 
neocortex of Homo sapiens (and other primates) holds the intellectual and reasoning 
abilities which Sagan says makes the species uniquely human. This is because, he tells 
us, the neocortex holds inside it the capacity for "all human symbolic language".49 A 
parallel to Aristotle, and his idea of the rational soul, can be easily extended to 
correspond with Sagan's observation. Even though Sagan acknowledges that the lines 
between brain functions and systems he describes blur, while Aristotle's souls are 
understood to be distinct, the similarity between the two understandings is undeniable. 
It should be recognized that Aristotle understood the soul to be not an object, but an arrangement. We 
must here note, if we recognize the parallel I am pointing out, that each brain system might be understood 
to be formed by one of each of the three kinds of soul described by Aristotle. 
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Sagan's identification of the neocortex as the source of human nature opens the 
door to a number of troubling questions for those who would restrict humanity solely to 
Homo sapiens. The most obvious is the question of whether the possession of a similar 
neocortex gives other animal species similar intellectual abilities to those possessed by 
Homo sapiens, especially if they share a (relatively) recent common ancestor. 
Considering the fact that both the brains of Homo sapiens and other animal species share 
the same systems and evolutionary history, Sagan shows us that no clear boundaries 
really separate the two. Homines sapientes (the plural form of Homo sapiens) are 
themselves a species of animal, a species which emerged slowly through the same 
evolutionary processes as every other animal. Thus he understands Homo sapiens to be 
physiologically only as unique as every other distinct animal species on the planet. 
Sagan is willing to say, however, that the species Homo sapiens is notable among all 
other known forms of animal life because 
"[w]e are the local embodiment of a Cosmos grown to self-awareness. We have 
begun to contemplate our origins: starstuff pondering the stars; organized 
assemblages often billion billion billion atoms considering the evolution of 
atoms; tracing the long journey by which, here at least, consciousness arose."50 
Because the universe becomes aware of itself in the species Homo sapiens, we might 
understand understand human uniqueness in this way. Thus because intelligence is such 
a significant development within the universe, and because the species Homo sapiens 
bears such a high degree of intelligence, the species can be understood in this way to be 
unique. 
Sagan, Carl. Cosmos. (New York: Ballantine, 1980). 345. 
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Sagan explicitly states that the sole determiner of human nature is intelligence, 
and that Homo sapiens can possess this particular attribute only with a functioning 
neocortex: 
"The reason we prohibit the killing of human beings must be because of some 
quality human beings possess, a quality we specially prize, that few or no other 
organisms on Earth enjoy. It cannot be the ability to feel pain or deep emotions, 
because that surely extends to many of the animals we gratuitously slaughter. 
This essential human quality, I believe, can only be our intelligence. If so, the 
particular sanctity of human life can be identified with the development and 
functioning of the neocortex."51 
He makes this statement after considering the issue of abortion, and the question of 
whether or not embryos of Homo sapiens (as well as adult comatose patients) ought to be 
considered human beings.52 His conclusion, that only a creature with a properly 
functioning neocortex can be considered human, may prove to be unsatisfying for some if 
it means denying humanity to unborn Homo sapiens or to individuals with mental 
impairments. Equally controversial is his suggestion that other organisms not of the 
species Homo sapiens, such as whales, dolphins or other apes, might qualify as human if 
their intelligence can be shown to compare to that of a "somewhat backward but fully 
developed" Homo sapiens.5 To think any other way would mean to be guilty of what 
Sagan calls "human chauvinism".54 This idea thus forces us to consider whether 
humanity may be possessed by just one particular species of animal, or may instead name 
a state of being that transcends species boundaries and can be tied to capacities reachable 
by any creature able to evolve in the proper way. 
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Such a redefinition is undeniably challenging, and may fail to satisfy those who 
believe Homo sapiens is more than just the sum of the physiology and capacities the 
species acquired through evolution. Because of this, another understanding of human 
nature shall be considered, one that has little use for scientific explanations. 
1.4. Contemporary Understandings of Human Nature: Joseph Ratzinger and 
Alasdair Maclntyre. In the following section, two other understandings of humanity 
shall be examined, through a brief summary of the writings of the Roman Catholic 
theologian Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) and ethicist Alasdair Maclntyre. This 
shall be done in order to consider the understandings of human nature found in theology 
and ethics. While the ultimate understanding of what humanity most fundamentally is 
could be seen as common to both, each discipline nevertheless offers its own particular 
understandings underlying its offered perspective. In other words, while an ethical 
understanding of human nature reaches its conclusions for certain reasons, these reasons 
will not be the same as those underlying the theological perspective. 
In a homily delivered in 1986, Joseph Ratzinger discussed the role of humanity in 
the world and the aspects that distinguish human nature from the rest of Creation. 
Ratzinger's understanding that human beings alone are entrusted by God with the 
responsibility of caring for the earth to serve as its masters is contrasted with his 
simultaneous acknowledgement that human beings were themselves parts of the earth, 
made out of its very dust.55 It was the breath of God animating this dust, he says, that 
allowed human beings to exist as a sort of "contact point" between heaven and earth. As 
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all human life is so intimately derived from God's and because God's life lives within 
every human being, Ratzinger says, all human beings are of one family, for all share the 
same divine soul.56 Ratzinger asserts that this fact serves as the most foundational reason 
for protecting human dignity, for each individual human being bears the life of God. 
Each individual brings into the world through his or her mere existence a unique idea of 
God, and was brought into existence through the same act of Creation.57 
Ratzinger observes that the scientific and technical attitudes prevalent in the late 
twentieth century have given human beings an opportunity to free themselves from the 
"superstitions and anxiety" that once tormented them.58 He states that this new 
understanding of religious beliefs about God and human nature is itself understood to be 
either irrational at best, and dangerous at worst, to be dangerous itself, for a purely 
scientific or biological worldview will no longer see human beings as sacred or special.59 
Ratzinger notes that as images take their significance from the objects or ideas which 
they represent and not the elements composing them, so too are human beings significant 
because they represent God. He compares the true uniqueness of the human race to that 
of the aesthetic value of a painting; while canvas and oil may allow us to see painted 
image, it is the idea or observation that inspired the artist, beyond the frame, that holds its 
true value.60 
Because Ratzinger understands God to be relational, both within Himself through 
the communion of the Persons of the Trinity and beyond Himself with the world, 
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Ratzinger states that human beings who close themselves away from loving relationships 
betray their most fundamental natures. Human beings possess capacities to have 
familiar and loving relationships with one another and with God, and so Ratzinger 
understands them to both share the same nature. Ratzinger understands from this that 
even though both may share common ancestors, human beings are distinct from animals 
because they are able to discover the loving relationship they have with God. 
Not opposed to evolution or to the development of purely scientific accounts of 
the origin of human life, Ratzinger understands the Creation stories of Genesis to serve a 
separate but still important purpose: 
"All of this is well and good, one might say, but is it not ultimately disproved by 
our scientific knowledge of how the human being evolved from the animal 
kingdom? Now, more reflective spirits have long been aware that there is no 
either—or here. We cannot say, creation or evolution, inasmuch as these two 
things respond to different realities. The story of the dust of the earth and the 
breath of God [...] does not in fact explain how human persons came to be, but 
rather what they are. It explains their inmost origin and casts light on the project 
that they are. And vice versa, the theory of evolution seeks to understand and 
describe biological developments. [...] [Wle are faced with two complementary--
rather than mutually exclusive—realities."6 
Ultimately, Ratzinger understands that human existence began when humanity's 
ancestors first gained an awareness of God: 
"Indeed, to the question as to what distinguishes the human being from an animal, 
as to what is specifically different about human beings, the answer has to be that 
they are the beings that God made capable of thinking and praying. They are 





Finally, Ratzinger understands that human beings are called to live in a Christian 
community, extending love and compassion to one another, stressing the mutual 
dependence each and every human being has on every other for his or her survival. 
Ratzinger believes that every human being is owed dignity and compassion in light of his 
or her existence as an image of God, and that every human being should extend their love 
to all those in the community because of this. He says, 
"It must once again be stressed that no human being is closed in upon himself or 
herself and that no one can live of or for himself or herself alone. We receive our 
life not only at the moment of birth but everyday from without - from others who 
are not ourselves but who nonetheless somehow pertain to us. Human beings 
have their selves not only in themselves but also outside of themselves: they live 
in those whom they love and in those who love them and to whom they are 
'present'."64 
This theological understanding of human nature perceives a loving communal 
relationship as the principle aspect of human nature, for it allows for human creatures to 
live in the image of God. This perspective is quite different from that offered by Sagan, 
who approached the animals he understood to be human from a strictly scientific and 
biological perspective. Sagan's conclusion of what allows for a human existence is far 
different from Ratzinger's, because he approaches his subjects from an entirely different 
background and perspective. Sagan, who has no belief in God, cannot understand 
humanity to exist in any sort of divine image, and as a result cannot see Homo sapiens as 
separate from other species of animal life. 
Different disciplines can lead ultimately to vastly different understandings of the 
same phenomenon, if they approach that phenomenon independently, as Sagan and 
Ratzinger have demonstrated. On the other hand, separate perspectives can also come to 
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understand a particular phenomenon in a very similar way, as Maclntyre shall now 
demonstrate. 
Ethicist Alasdair Maclntyre defines human beings not as primarily rational, but as 
most basically embodied, and as a result, fundamentally helpless and disabled: 
"We human beings are vulnerable to many kinds of affliction and most of us are 
at some time afflicted by serious ills. How we cope is only in small part up to us. 
It is most often to others that we owe our survival, let alone our flourishing, as we 
encounter bodily illness and injury, inadequate nutrition, mental defect and 
disturbance, and human aggression and neglect."65 
Noting that Western moral philosophers from Plato to Moore have made "only passing 
references to human vulnerability and affliction"66, Maclntyre nevertheless believes that 
an acknowledgement of both the fact of human vulnerability, and of the human 
dependence on others, to be absolutely vital to accurately describing the human 
condition. Maclntyre's understanding at the same time stresses the fact that human 
beings are ultimately animals, products of biological processes against a world of similar 
animal species, and that very little distinguishes the human kind from any other animal 
kind. As a result of this vulnerability, Maclntyre stresses the intense need each individual 
human being has for the other members of his or her community; while alone he may be 
nothing, with the help of his or her family he or she can survive and flourish. 7 
Not believing that any clear line can be shown to stand between human and 
animal nature, Maclntyre views the human refusal to acknowledge its animal existence to 
be both prejudicial and the source of such misunderstandings of human nature as the 
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Cartesian soul and a unique mind-body dualism. Maclntyre stresses the fact that even if 
Homo sapiens is capable of behavior or actions beyond those of other animals, the 
biological nature of Homo sapiens underlies all they have evolved to be.69 
Maclntyre mentions Heidegger's sharp separation between language-using 
humans and non- language using animals, and states that such a distinction is mistaken. 
Human nature's relation to a biological animal nature has been traditionally viewed to be, 
Maclntyre says, 
"[...] external and contingent in a way and to a degree that permits a single sharp 
line to be drawn between human beings and members of all nonhuman species. 
And that line is the line between those who possess language and those who do 
not. It is of course right to insist upon the significance of the differences between 
language -possessing and non-language-possessing animals. And some of these 
will be of crucial importance for my enquiry. But what exclusive, or almost 
exclusive attention to these differences may and commonly does obscure is the 
significance of the continuity and resemblances between some aspects of the 
intelligent activities of nonhuman animals and the language-informed practical 
rationality of human beings." 
Maclntyre includes in his argument the lack of a distinct division between language and 
non-linguistic forms of communication. Rather than a clear boundary, there is a 
spectrum of intermediate states, including a performance of intentional action, the 
recognition of an object, and belief about a recognized object.71 Maclntyre defines 
language as an evolving feature that rests on a foundation of capacities such as 
recognition and belief, that are to be found in other forms of animal life and thus show 
that these shared abilities link language users with non- language users too closely to 
warrant any kind of clear separation. Maclntyre also notes the social existence Homo 
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sapiens shares with many other animal species, such as chimpanzees and dolphins. The 
similar communitarian lifestyles shared between these species, together with Homo 
sapiens, casts the idea of a clear separation between Homo sapiens and other animal 
species even further into doubt. At the same time, an acknowledgement of a shared kind 
of existence reaffirms the animal identity of Homo sapiens. 
Because the community offers members of the species Homo sapiens a means of 
dealing with their physical frailties in the face of a dangerous world, the understanding 
that Homo sapiens is a social animal presents another essential dimension to human 
nature. The fact that it is an adaptation, however, gives Maclntyre cause to state that 
Homo sapiens is most fundamentally a vulnerable animal. If Homo sapiens is a human 
species, then to be human means ultimately to be nothing alone. 
It might be noted that Maclntyre's emphasis on the animal nature of Homo 
sapiens allows him to build upon Sagan's biological understanding. Yet his recognition 
of human vulnerability also likens his view to Ratzinger's, who recognizes that human 
survival rests on the support of the loving Christian community. In a way, Maclntyre's 
understanding has a parallel to each. 
1.5. Contemporary Understandings of Human Nature: J. Wentzel van Huyssteen. 
This section shall explore the multidisciplinary understanding of human nature described 
by J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, in the hope that it may provide us with a more satisfying 
understanding than any provided by a single discipline of study. An author on such 
varied topics as epistemology and anthropology as well as a professor of both theology 
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and science, van Huyssteen passionately defends the idea that the best way to study any 
object of knowledge is to employ a multidisciplinary approach that considers the 
understanding of that object from many different viewpoints. 
Thus in the case of Homo sapiens, van Huyssteen's description does not involve 
pinpointing one physiological aspect, social relationship, or behavioral trait, for this 
would fail to account for all the other ways in which the species is unique. Van 
Huyssteen would understand the unique nature of Homo sapiens, or any other object of 
study to be revealed through the consideration of an overlapping and mutually 
complimentary set of particular points of view. Doing so might single it out several 
different way in which Homo sapiens is unique and distinct. 
Through God, van Huyssteen demonstrates his reason for believing that science 
can after all say something about divinity, in spite of Ratzinger's claim that the two are 
separate. Science, van Huyssteen says, can affirm or cast into doubt particular 
theological understandings of God, in order to demonstrate which of them is the most 
likely to offer the most accurate description.74 While scientific knowledge of the universe 
on its own could inspire particular ideas of God, as it has for philosophers such as Antony 
i f 
Flew, who has come to embrace a form of deism, such ideas are not obviously 
reconcilable with the God of the Judeo-Christian religion. The understanding that God 
does and can reveal Himself through both religious experiences and the testimony of 
religious texts can provide an additional body of knowledge that can help to more clearly 
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shape one's understanding of God. To present one example, van Huyssteen notes how for 
theologians like himself, Darwinian theory has affirmed the immanence and involvement 
of the creating God within His universe, showing Him to be actively participating in the 
continuing realization of His Creation: 
"What Darwin did manage to show, and is still continuing to show us today, is 
that — at least for some of us who are theologians ~ traditional images of a totally 
transcendent God had been seriously overdrawn. As we will see, a theistic notion 
of God which includes a strong notion of God's immanence and involvement with 
the world may actually be rendered more plausible by Darwinian evolution. After 
Darwin it has become impossible for Christian believers to think of God in the 
semi-deist image of an absentee landlord who only interferes on rare occasions. 
Darwin, to his credit, sharpened up the choice: it would now be a question of all 
or nothing. God is either an active participant, immanent in the world, or 
completely absent."7 
Notions of deism could thus become more difficult to defend, especially if one uses 
evolution to support an Eriugenan notion of a God who uses the world to realize 
existential possibilities, and employs over time many limited entities to reflect His own 
infinite nature. While such an understanding of God would rely in part on knowledge of 
God gained through revelation, it would also be based on empirical evidence, and so 
would, as a result, give reasons to reject religious understandings of God that seem 
inconsistent with the physical evidence available to the considerer. Finding a "safe 
space" where science and theology can complement one another in a "graceful duet", van 
Huyssteen says, allows theologians to truly speak meaningfully about God.77 
Such an approach is significant because it allows us to, if we have faith in the 
reality of God, understand God to be an ever-active "accessory" to physical existence. 
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This allows us to invoke God as a cause of the events and objects of the world without 
falling into the trap of invoking a "God of the gaps" explanation. God remains invisible 
and empirically unprovable, yet a study of the world can reveal new understandings about 
the God who created it and glimpses of the divine nature. However, the consideration of 
just one method of acquiring knowledge about God would fail to give a full 
understanding of what God's nature must be like, and may even present a distorted view. 
Van Huyssteen himself attempts to avoid this in regard to Homo sapiens, by considering 
the species from many different perspectives, all the while attempting to relate the 
perspectives. He does this in order to uncover all the knowable attributes that make the 
species unique from the rest of nature. 
One thing van Huyssteen considers in his investigation is the idea that both 
traditional and contemporary theological notions of human uniqueness often fail to 
consider the evolution and animal nature of the human species to be a source of insight 
into the uniqueness of Homo sapiens. Scientific and religious beliefs have become 
estranged as a result of this failure, while theological definitions of human nature have 
become increasingly abstract and impossible to investigate empirically. 
Desiring to find a way to link the two, van Huyssteen begins by considering 
scientific understandings of the uniqueness of Homo sapiens by focusing on Darwin and 
his impact on contemporary conceptions of human nature, noting that it is the cognitive 
capacities for reason, language, and morality that serve as the most significant marks of 
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distinction "between man and the lower animals". Recognizing that this Darwinian 
conception of human uniqueness remains the most influential and enduring understanding 
in contemporary science, van Huyssteen wishes to uncover the origin of these uniquely 
human attributes through an investigation into paleo-anthropology. Stressing the cultural 
existence of Homo sapiens as an important aspect of its human nature, van Huyssteen 
notes that the members of the species Homo sapiens evolved both biologically and 
culturally. Born into particular cultural milieus that were rooted in their biological 
capacities and vulnerabilities, every experience endured by a member of the species 
Homo sapiens was filtered through a particular cultural way of thinking. The evolution 
of that individual's culture was then able to progress as its members contributed to it 
through their own experiences and resulting beliefs, which augmented and extended the 
belief systems predating their lives.80 
Van Huyssteen sees evolution as a continuous process transcending the mediums 
of its operation: 
"On the one hand, then, organic evolution - particularly the evolution of the 
human brain - can be seen as the basis of cultural evolution. On the other hand, 
however, the latter can never be reduced to the former: cultural evolution requires 
explanations beyond the biological theory of evolution in its strictest sense. 
Therefore the term 'evolution' applies to both the development of the organic 
world, from unicellular organisms to humans, and the development of culture."81 
Van Huyssteen's understanding sees evolution working first through biology and then 
through culture, transitioning from one to the next by means of the Homo sapiens mind, 
which it formed through its processes and then put to use. As experiences occurring 
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outside an organism's biological form allowed culture to shape and evolve, evolution can 
be understood to have entered into an entirely new kind of "world" in which to operate. 
Van Huyssteen understands culture to be ultimately rooted in Homo sapiens' biological 
origins and capacities, though not completely explainable on a biological level, as 
currently-lived lives and preserved histories serve as equally important foundations. 
Thus van Huyssteen turns next to cultural, theological conceptions of humanity, 
which include the notion that humankind was made in the image of God. A study of 
more ancient understandings of imago Dei demonstrated that both traditional Old 
Testament understandings, together with early Christian conceptions clearly saw 
humanity to be a part of the physical world. These traditional views emphasized its 
embodied existence rather than an intellectual soul, recognizing that while human beings 
were the bearers of God's life in world, their limited natures allowed them to act in ways 
not at all like God, even though they possessed the awareness to know the difference 
between Godliness and ungodliness. He tells us that 
"for [Alasdair] Maclntyre, whatever our degree of difference from other animals 
may be, it is our evolutionary developed bodies that are the bearers of human 
uniqueness, and it is this embodied existence that confronts us with the realities of 
vulnerability and affliction. [...] For this reason the image of God is not found in 
some intellectual or spiritual capacity, but in the whole embodied human being, 
'body and soul'. In fact, the image of God is not found in humans, but is the 
human, and for this reason imago Dei can be read only as imitatio Dei: to be 
created in God's image means we should act like God, and so attain holiness by 
caring for others and for the world."84 
82
 Ibid., 272-273. 
83
 van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology. (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006). 315. 
84
 Ibid., 320. 
35 
Van Huyssteen's statement that the idea of imago Dei is equivalent to the notion of 
imitatio Dei means that for human beings to be truly unique among all of God's creations, 
they must act as God acts in order to reflect His nature. Van Huyssteen also discusses 
Calvin's assertion that human beings must be just and merciful just as God is just and 
OS 
merciful in order to accomplish this. Such ideas strongly parallel the understanding put 
forth by Ratzinger, as well as the understanding of human nature held by Maclntyre. In 
fact, van Huyssteen specifically discusses Maclntyre as an effective description of the 
implications of humanity's embodied physical nature. He points out that humankind's 
weakness and dependence allow them opportunities to act in God's place in the world, 
and to imitate the divine.86 
It must be noted that because van Huyssteen understands both religious and 
scientific views to be products of culture, it is possible to explain the origins and history 
of each provided that the proper archaeological and anthropological information to reveal 
such histories is available. Because of this, either may be understood to be rational in its 
own way, rooted in particular biological capacities that through life experience give rise 
to particular ways of thinking and seeing the world. Nevertheless, simply one scientific 
explanation or one theological definition of what makes an organism "human" would lack 
the descriptiveness and effectiveness of a definition that incorporated a number of 
different viewpoints from several disciplines of cultural knowledge. This is why neither 
Sagan's nor Ratzinger's explanations of human nature would alone satisfy van Huyssteen: 
while both might be true as far as they can speak about humanity, neither is able to tell 
the whole story. While Ratzinger cannot tell us biologically how human beings are able 
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to emulate God in the physical world, Sagan cannot ultimately say why the neocortex 
functions as it does and provides Homo sapiens with such unique abilities. 
Another strength can be found in the way one perspective is able to answer 
questions or deal with issues beyond the other's authority; while Ratzinger's 
understanding that the breath of God gives humanity allows him to defend the humanity 
of an early-stage embryo, Sagan cannot claim humanity to be present in an embryo or 
fetus until sufficient neocortical activity is present. Even the possibility of this being a 
sufficient reason is only a reasonable guess, as Sagan himself admits: 
"But perhaps we might set the transition to humanity at the time when neocortical 
on 
activity begins, as determined by electroencephalography of the fetus". 
"Perhaps we might". As it can be demonstrated, employing a multidisciplinary approach 
holds clear advantages over one gained from a single magisterium of study, for it offers a 
greater and more comprehensive understanding of the relevant object of knowledge. 
Through his multidisciplinary approach, van Huyssteen is able to find a way to accept 
both the views of human nature provided by Ratzinger and Maclntyre alongside the one 
put forth by Sagan. He is even able to show how both biological and cultural evolution 
may serve as a source of the theological and scientific approaches Homines sapientes 
go 
employ as they seek to understand themselves. We might observe, in light of this, that 
the ethical understanding of humanity demonstrates the practical value of the theological. 
The theological view may then be challenged by the scientific one, in order to determine 
whether or not it seems reasonable, if God does exist and has revealed Himself to 
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particular creatures inhabiting His Creation. The theological understanding of humanity, 
in the meantime, can serve as a foundation for the ethical understanding, justifying its 
practices. If capacities for reasonable and abstract thought can allow an individual to 
know and understand his or her responsibility to his or her fellow human beings in the 
world, then that religious view can be considered a plausible possibility. It may then be 
tested against other plausible views, so that in the end, the understanding of a human 
nature made in the image of God can be at its fullest and most complete. 
Scientific, theological, and ethical understandings of human nature allow van 
Huyssteen to describe the human being as the possessor of capacities for "language, self-
awareness, moral awareness, consciousness, symbolic propensities, [and] ritual and 
mythology." At the same time, in agreement with the Darwinian definition of human 
uniqueness discussed already, van Huyssteen would also say that Homo sapiens is a 
distinct species due to its status as the sole surviving member of the taxonomic family of 
Hominidea, and thus unique in its possession of both a fully bipedal stance and a 
particularly sophisticated neocortex. More than this, van Huyssteen notes: 
"We are also identified by the unique presence of a spoken language; the 
remarkable cognitive fluidity to think, reason, plan, and generate mental symbols, 
especially as expressed in art and religion; and the bizarre inability to sustain 
prolonged amounts of boredom."90 
1.6. Conclusion. Over the course of this chapter, I have shown how many different 
thinkers of many different backgrounds have offered many different ways and reasons for 
believing that human beings are unique from all other forms of animal life. Through my 
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look at van Huyssteen, I have shown that good reasons exist to attempt to pursue an 
understanding of human nature that is not restricted to one single domain of study. This 
seems especially reasonable if we recognize that multiple perspectives will provide a 
wealth of valuable information to anyone who considers them, far more than just one 
discipline. If someone wishes to make a case for a unique status for humanity, a status 
that distinguishes it from the rest of nature, then it is necessary to reach a thorough and 
comprehensive understanding of what human beings are. 
If van Huyssteen's multidisciplinary definition of human nature is judged to be an 
accurate and satisfactory assessment of human nature, accounting for many unique 
abilities and physiological traits that allow creatures possessing them to play the role 
described by theological notion of humanity, then we may judge the strength of the 
uniqueness Homo sapiens possesses by considering how many of these human attributes 
it has in common with other animal species. This shall be the focus of the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter Two: Is a New Understanding of "Humanity" Necessary? 
The purpose of this chapter shall be to consider the nature of the uniqueness possessed by 
Homo sapiens, in light of its animal natures and the capacities it shares with other animal 
species. If the difference between Homo sapiens and other animal species is one of 
degree rather than kind, it might be wondered whether or not humanity itself might be 
found in other species, even if in lesser degrees. The following sections shall consider 
this possibility. 
The previous chapter established that the multidisciplinary understanding of 
humanity defended by van Huyssteen offers the most comprehensive picture of what 
makes an organism human. While van Huyssteen presents biology and culture as the 
places where we find the answer to how an animal is able to act in a human way, it is the 
role of ethics to tell us what that human way of acting entails. Anthropology and 
paleoanthropology, he says, can reveal to us which species can be understood to be or 
have been human through observing their behavior, and together with archaeology can 
tell us where and when other human creatures can be demonstrated to have once 
existed.91 Theology then, van Huyssteen claims, is left to explain ultimately why human 
nature exists, as well as reveal to us on a higher level what human nature is, with the 
understanding that it reflects the imago Dei?2 
This chapter shall begin by challenging us to find a human nature in other animal 
species, through offering reasons why it should be reasonable to do so. The views of a 
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thinker who hopes to reconcile animal nature and human uniqueness by recognizing 
humanity to exist in other species shall then be considered. This controversial 
understanding of human nature shall then be compared with van Huyssteen's 
understanding, continuing what was begun in the preceding chapter. 
2.1. "Human" and "Homo sapiens": No Longer Perfect Synonyms? The purpose of 
this section shall be to determine whether or not it is plausible for human nature to exist 
in another species besides Homo sapiens. This shall be done in light of the 
multidisciplinary understanding of humanity offered by van Huyssteen in the last chapter, 
recognizing that all of Homo sapiens particular physiological and behavioral traits are 
products of biological and cultural evolutionary processes.93 
Homo sapiens is so universally understood to be a human species that the very 
word "human" is interchangeable with the scientific name, "Homo sapiens". Because of 
this, the idea that humanity could be possessed by other organisms has been somewhat 
difficult for many Homines sapientes to come to terms with, both in Carl Linnaeus's time 
and until the present day.94 Even when Carl Sagan notes that while a whale capable of 
the same neocortical functions as the species Homo sapiens should also be considered a 
human being,95 he nevertheless continues to use the word "human" when referring 
specifically to the species Homo sapiens throughout his book.96 Though I myself have 
attempted to avoid using the two terms interchangeably up to this point, doing so has 
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proven to be a challenge, especially when presenting the ideas of an authority like 
Ratzinger who, while clearly having Homo sapiens in mind when he refers to humans, 
never singles out that particular species when he actually uses the term, "human". 
The reason this attempt was made arises now, as it becomes the focus of this first 
part of this second chapter to determine whether Sagan was correct in his speculations 
that human nature could exist in other animal species. The evolution of Homo sapiens 
from other related forms of animal life offers no reason, at least from the perspective of 
science, why humanity should not be found somewhere besides the species Homo 
sapiens. As it is through biological mechanisms such as evolution that allow for human 
nature to exist in the world, a serious search for humanity in other species, especially 
those related closely to Homo sapiens, of common ancestry and a similar evolutionary 
history, may reasonably reveal a similar nature to theirs, or at least the beginnings of one. 
The existence of a possible human nature in another species of animal could drastically 
alter any conceptions we might have of human uniqueness. The tendency of Homo 
sapiens to separate itself from other animal species would be given a further reason for 
rejection if it could be shown that no capacity or behavior was exclusively exhibited by 
Homo sapiens. It is this possibility which shall be explored in the next section of this 
chapter. 
The discipline of ethics has very little to say about restricting the ability to live as 
a human being to one species; Maclntyre makes references and comparisons to the 
similar social existence of dolphins and chimpanzees, noting that in this way, such animal 
species have much in common with Homo sapiens. Also, the endangered status of 
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chimpanzees and other primates allows us to understand these species to be vulnerable 
much in the way Maclntyre saw humanity to be.97 However, the question of whether 
human existence is to be found elsewhere in nature besides Homo sapiens may be more 
difficult to investigate from a theological perspective. It might even appear to challenge 
some theological understandings of why Homo sapiens is unique, in light of such 
religious (and particularly Christian) beliefs as the Incarnation of God in Jesus of 
Nazareth. Jesus's status as a member of the species Homo sapiens might seem, on one 
hand, to restrict the possibility of creatures capable of knowing and emulating God to that 
particular species. On the other hand, Ratzinger's acknowledgement of the humble 
origins of human nature in the dust of the earth, together with his acceptance of 
evolutionary processes, may allow for us to be a bit more open to the possibility.98 Let us 
consider the possibility, for the moment. Would such creatures be understood to be 
ultimately the same as Homo sapiens in all the significant ways, possessing the same 
intellectual abilities, relationships, and vulnerabilities? The understanding of an 
omnipotent God capable of creatively expressing Himself through an infinite number of 
ways might also open the way for a possible theological investigation. 
As a result of recognizing this, we have a theological reason to suspect that a 
nature greatly resembling the human nature of the species Homo sapiens could be found 
elsewhere in the created world. If such a nature could indeed be found, a careful analysis 
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could reveal whether or not the differences which separate it from the nature possessed 
by Homo sapiens are enough to deny understanding it to be truly "human". 
2.2. Looking Elsewhere: The "Old Men" of Sumatra and Borneo. In this section, I 
shall examine a species which serves as a possible candidate for the possession of human 
nature outside the species Homo sapiens. I shall also offer an explanation of why 
expecting to find a human nature in that species is reasonable. 
The most logical place to begin searching would seem to be among the species 
most closely related to Homo sapiens. As the other species of hominid belonging to the 
genus Homo are presently extinct, only a few distant relatives exist that could feasibly 
share a nature close to Homo sapiens'. With no living specimens of Australopithecus or 
Homo erectus alive to study, only four candidates exist that could even begin to seem 
suitable: the orang-utan, the gorilla, and the two species of chimpanzee. Of these, the 
primate that arguably could serve as an effective subject of study in such an investigation 
is the orang-utan, for a number of important reasons. Though the species evolved in Asia 
and not Africa, unlike Homo sapiens and the other species of great ape that continue to 
survive, the orang-utan has been observed to possess a significant number of behavioral 
and biological similarities to modern Homo sapiens. To begin, the native peoples of 
Malaysia, who lived for centuries in constant contact with the species, believed them to 
be a more ancient race of persons like themselves, able to speak but silent by choice. In 
Miles, H. Lyn White. "Language and the Orang-utan." The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond 
Humanity, eds. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 43. 
44 
fact, the term "orang-utan" is derived from Malay words which mean, "old person of the 
forest".100 
Physiologically, orang-utans share a long list of similarities with Homo sapiens, 
as recounted by anthropologist Lyn Miles, which include, she states, 
"a similar gestation period, brain hemispheric asymmetry, characteristics of 
dentition, sexual physiology, copulatory behavior, hormonal levels, hair pattern, 
mammary gland placement, and insightful style of cognition". 
Orang-utans have also been observed to stand and walk fully upright while 
occupying tree branches, using their free hands to pick fruit from overhanging limbs 
otherwise beyond their reach.102 This has lead anthropologists such as Susannah K. S. 
Thorpe to theorize that a similar bipedal stance was common to all tree-dwelling apes up 
to five million years ago, until diminishing forest lands in Africa imposed changes onto 
the apes that would serve as the ancestors of present-day gorillas, chimpanzees, and 
Homo sapiens. The conclusion of such a view is that while the ancestors of Homo 
sapiens eventually regained their ability to stand fully erect, as other African great apes 
advanced no further than knuckle-walking, the Asian ancestors of the orang-utans 
preserved this ancient ability.103 The orang-utan thus serves as an important link to 
Homo sapiens' prehistoric past, for it retains both a lifestyle and physiological features 
once possessed by both their common ancestors, abandoned by every other species of 
great ape. This sentiment is reiterated by Miles, who notes, 
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"Both the fossil data and comparisons of DNA and other biochemical measures 
suggest that the orang-utan is the most conservative, or primitive, of the great 
apes. They are most like the ancestral hominoid (ape-like primate) living about 
twelve million years ago that later gave rise to apes and humans. Orang-utans 
have retained more of the characteristics of this hominoid than have the African 
apes. As a result, orang-utans have been labeled a 'living fossil', and thus are a 
kind of time traveller." °4 
In addition to such physiological traits as bipedalism, the observation of orang-
utans in both their natural habitat and in captivity has revealed startlingly Homo sapiens-
like behavior and abilities. While orang-utans in the jungles of Sumatra and Borneo have 
been observed to build shelters and teach one another to use simple tools, orang-utans in 
captivity have been taught to tie knots, make blades out of flint, and put them to practical 
use.105 The facts of physiological and behavioral similarity, common ancestry, and 
capacities for culture and tool use all point to the conclusion that the orang-utan should 
be viewed as an ideal candidate for consideration in the quest for humanity beyond the 
species Homo sapiens. 
While the solitary nature of orang-utans contrasts sharply with the social 
existence shared by Homo sapiens, the orang-utan compensates through its possession of 
these other distinct characteristics. Carl Sagan and van Huyssteen each point out the 
importance of bipedalism to the cognitive development of the species Homo sapiens and 
the evolution of the brain.106 Because the brains of orang-utans and Homo sapiens share 
a number of similar features, the different social habits practiced by each should not 
discourage the search for a possible human nature in this species. 
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While their vocal chords are not suitable for spoken language, orang-utans have 
nevertheless demonstrated linguistic abilities through experiments in which captive 
individuals were taught to use American Sign Language. Lyn Miles was the first 
anthropologist to conduct such an experiment with a member of this species, as she for a 
period of nine years instructed and observed a young orang-utan named Chantek. At the 
age often months, Chantek began to demonstrate his understanding of the signs being 
10R 
taught to him by signing to his caregivers on his own. As time passed, Chantek 
displayed an ability to use 150 different words,109 as well as understand the 
corresponding terms for them in spoken English, as his teachers often vocalized the 
words they signed when they addressed him. Chantek demonstrated this ability to 
recognize spoken words by performing the signs corresponding to words he recognized 
while listening to the radio.110 
As he employed the signs in his vocabulary to communicate and express his 
needs, Miles and her colleagues noted that Chantek did not just repeat the signs he had 
been taught, but used them in spontaneous and creative ways. As Chantek encountered 
new objects and people he had never seen before, he coined new expressions and sign 
combinations in order to address or call attention to them. Dubbing the contact lens 
solution he observed one of his caregivers using "eye-drink" and referring to a university 
employee whom he saw frequently as "Dave-missing-finger" on account of a hand injury 
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the man had once suffered, Miles asserts that Chantek became under her instruction not 
just a learner, but a "creator of language".111 
In addition to Chantek's ability to recognize and use signs to communicate his 
needs and thoughts, Miles describes a number of distinct behaviors and capacities 
demonstrated by Chantek typically only ascribed to Homo sapiens as marks of human 
uniqueness. Noting that one indicator of a capacity for symbolic thought is the 
behavior of pointing with an extended finger, Miles recounts how Chantek first began to 
perform this action at around the age of two years (slightly later, she notes, than in 
children of the species Homo sapiens) in order to indicate where he wanted to be carried 
and later to answer simple questions.113 Miles also discusses how Chantek displayed an 
ability to refer to objects and events not physically present in the room with him. Miles 
notes that the ability to conceptually represent an object of experience and then retain the 
image of it in that object's absence was an important step in the development of language 
in Homo sapiens, as it allowed the species' ancestors to communicate concepts in many 
different environments and circumstances. Regarding this, Miles refers to an incident in 
which Chantek told both her and another of Chantek's caretakers that he wanted to go for 
a car ride. As the car neared a particular location, Chantek signaled the words, "ice 
cream" and attempted to commandeer the wheel in the direction of an ice cream shop he 
had been taken to on previous occasions.114 Through situations such as these, Miles tells 
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us that Chantek displays evidence of being cognitively "free from his environment", in 
her words, his thoughts not restricted to objects and settings presently before his eyes.115 
Another form of behavior displayed by Chantek that Miles describes is deception, 
as she recounts several incidents that demonstrate Chantek's ability to lie. Among them 
Miles describes an occasion where Chantek took one of her pencil erasers and, after 
pretending to swallow it, opened his mouth widely for her in order to show her that it was 
gone. In spite of his demonstration, and his signing to Miles the words, "food-eat", 
Chantek had in fact concealed the eraser in his cheek. Miles reveals that the eraser was 
eventually discovered in Chantek's bedroom, in a hiding place where he placed objects he 
wished to keep secret. Miles notes such behavior as significant because deception 
demonstrates an ability to put one's self in the place of another and imagine the way that 
other would think in a particular situation.116 
Miles finishes her essay on Chantek with a reflection on the meaning of the word 
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"person", naming not just a list of qualifying characteristics as Dennett did, but instead 
describing the nature of the relationships that organism is capable of sharing with others. 
Specifically, she states that the notion of personhood arises from the cultural tendency of 
Homo sapiens to recognize some beings as like themselves ("us"), while seeing other 
beings as entirely different ("them" or "other") in nature.118 Looking at Chantek, Miles 
writes that she would not consider him to be either entirely like herself or like a free-
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living orang-utan, but instead "something in between".119 Miles understands that an 
individual's ability to communicate with, and to relate to, others determines whether or 
not those others accept that individual as one of their own. In the case of Chantek, the 
language and culture of another species have allowed him to act in a way similar to that 
species relationally and socially. At the same time his relationship with members of his 
own species, whom he continued to interact with, allowed them to accept him as one of 
their own kind. While not denying his orang-utan nature, Miles believes that the 
language and culture of the species Homo sapiens have shown Chantek to be both 
ethically and socially a person, just as would be any immature Homo sapiens who 
displayed fewer of the characteristics and capacities as those possessed by Chantek.120 
Given that Chantek is physiologically no different from other member of his own species, 
and given the number of physiological similarities shared between orang-utans and 
members of the species Homo sapiens, already discussed, a convincing case can be made 
for those who would defend their personhood. 
Miles's observations of Chantek make a convincing case for the personhood of 
orang-utans, and a comparison between Miles's and Maclntyre's understanding of human 
nature from the previous chapter shows Miles's notion of personhood to be fully 
compatible with Maclntyre's understanding of human nature. This is especially true 
when considering the current plight of the free-living apes remaining in Africa and 
Southeast Asia, whose survival depends entirely on Homo sapiens' holding back from the 
further destruction of their habitats. As a species, orang-utans are truly vulnerable, just 
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as Maclntyre described human nature to be, and are most certainly in need of humane 
care and protection from those others in a position to give it to them. 
2.3. Explaining Discontinuity: Western Attitudes Toward Other Primates. Though 
the preceding section offered a number of convincing arguments to at least consider the 
humanity of another animal species, many Homines sapientes would likely remain 
skeptical. This is because many Homines sapientes perceive a kind of discontinuity 
between their own kind and other animals. As biologist Richard Dawkins puts it, 
"The word 'apes' usually means chimpanzees, gorillas, orang-utans, gibbons, and 
siamangs. We admit that we are like apes, but we seldom realise that we are 
apes. Our common ancestor with the chimpanzees and gorillas is much more 
recent than their common ancestor with the Asian apes, the gibbons and orang-
utans. There is no natural category that includes chimpanzees, gorillas, and 
orang-utans but excludes humans."122 
What Dawkins means is that, however much the members of the species might deny it, 
Homo sapiens is biologically just as much a kind of ape as is the gorilla or orang-utan. 
The section which follows shall address the cultural tendency of Homo sapiens to set 
themselves apart from the rest of the animal world, in spite of their close physiological 
and biological relation to it. 
In light of the acceptance of Darwinian evolution, modern biology has come to 
embrace the understanding that Homo sapiens is not only descended from other forms of 
animal life, but is in fact just one of many other related, surviving, species. While 
scientific investigators such as Carl Sagan, considered in the first chapter, embrace this 
fact, much of Western thought has largely resisted in following his example. 
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Philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, as noted in the previous chapter, as well as many 
others, denied beliefs to other animals on the basis that they do not use language.123 In 
fact, Maclntyre tells us how Heidegger once wrote of the '"scarcely fathomable, abyssal' 
character of the 'bodily kinship' of humans to animals."124 The origin of this attitude in 
Western thought shall now be investigated. 
I shall begin by noting that not every Westerner shares this sentiment. For 
example, Lyn Miles's studies with Chantek allowed her to experience him as something 
more than a mere animal: 
"We have lived day to day with Chantek and have shared common experiences, as 
if he were a child. We have healed his hurts, comforted his fears of stray cats, 
played keep-away games, cracked nuts in the woods with stones, watched him 
sign to himself, felt fooled by his deceptions and frustrated when he became bored 
with his tasks. We have dreamed about him, had conversations in our 
imagination with him, and loved him. Through these rare events shared with 
another species, I have no doubt I was experiencing Chantek as a person."125 
Through these words, Miles shows us that she has rediscovered the thought of James 
Burnett, Lord Monboddo, who in the eighteenth century asserted that the orang-utan was 
indeed a human being, and that, contrary to Aristotle, speech was not a necessary 
determiner of a being's personhood.126 While the indigenous Malay people of Southeast 
Asia might have always comfortably accepted the orang-utans living in the forests 
alongside them as kindred, the people of the Western world have not, at least in recent 
centuries, been so typically open to recognizing a similar nature behind a different 
appearance, even when that difference is quite minor. 
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Yet this attitude was not always true of European people; before the Age of 
Discovery and the following colonial period, Europeans had no conception of race, or 
even a notion of "Europeans" as a collective group. According to historian James W. 
Loewen, it was only when explorers encountered such (in their minds) foreign peoples as 
the American Indians that this began to change. These encounters resulted in a new way 
for the people of such countries as Spain or Portugal to see themselves, as they came to 
regard themselves as different from the people they found inhabiting the West Indes. 
As a result of the formation of a European self-consciousness, the way people from other 
parts of the world were perceived began to change. The unchristian beliefs of the 
American Indians, together with the lack of any mention of them in the Bible, prompted 
some Westerners to regard them as less than human, unrelated to the lineages of people 
described in biblical history. While Monboddo regarded orang-utans to be of his own 
kind, his contemporaries, Voltaire among them, excluded the African people whom 
Voltaire called "Hottentots".129 Monboddo's ideas, therefore, represent a definite break 
from the prevailing attitudes of his place and time, and the last centuries leading up to it, 
and voice sentiments which Miles would no doubt agree with two hundred years later. 
The lack of any indigenous apes in Europe (besides Homo sapiens) surely helped 
contribute to the discontinuous nature of the Western mind. The people of other parts of 
the world, such as India and Japan, held vastly different views of apes and monkeys than 
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would Europeans after encountering them in their overseas explorations. In addition to 
the attitudes of the Malay toward orang-utans, already discussed, other non- Western 
views acknowledged the similarities apes held to Homo sapiens, and understood, through 
this resemblance, that apes were the "wisest of beasts" and intermediaries between 
humanity and nature. A number of Eastern religions took from their recognition of this 
similarity an understanding that apes lived a sort of divine existence, bridging the gap 
between their own kind and animal nature, between human society and the wilderness.131 
Thousands of years of exposure to creatures so similar in appearance to themselves 
fostered in Eastern minds attitudes toward these creatures that elevated them above other 
animals, in light of their similarity and obviously kindred nature. 
Europeans could not have understood things more differently. The eighteenth and 
nineteenth century explorers and colonists of Africa and Asia saw apes as either savage 
or comical, imagining them to be either unrestrained monstrosities, utterly unlike human 
beings, to clowns when displayed dressed in human clothing, as parodies of human 
nature.132 Some Europeans of the period even identified primates, such as baboons, with 
the devil, seeing them not as links with the natural world, as Asian cultures did, but as 
wicked, distorted images of themselves. While the prevailing nineteenth century belief 
that the gorilla was a savage and bloodthirsty monster could not have been more different 
from the comical chimpanzee as a circus performer, neither understanding saw these 
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creatures to be intelligent, and failed to recognize them as anything like the person Lyn 
Miles saw in Chantek. 
Let us conclude this section. The exploration of North and South America and 
later sub-Saharan Africa brought Europeans into contact with people so politically and 
religiously different from themselves that Europeans became aware of themselves as a 
distinct "kind" of people. As this happened, the differences between themselves and the 
people of places such as Ethiopia, gave way to attitudes that they were inferior to 
Europeans as well. 4 If other people were to be judged as less human than themselves, 
then it is little surprise to find that apes were seen as even less human, through Western 
eyes. In light of the findings of language experiments such as those conducted by Miles 
with Chantek, convincing reasons exist to believe that animal nature is not so different 
from the nature of the species Homo sapiens after all. Understanding that much of 
observable human nature may not be exclusive to the species Homo sapiens forces us to 
consider whether whether non- Homo sapiens species exhibiting "human behavior" might 
themselves be called "human" after all. Recognizing that Homo sapiens' tendency and to 
restrict humanity to its own species may be, in fact, nothing more than a Western cultural 
practice may free us to consider intelligent animal life from another point of view. The 
careful weighing of this possibility may result in a need to re-understand what humanity 
really means. 
The ideas of a theistic thinker who does try to drastically revise our understanding 
of humanity in light of all of this shall be considered in the next section. 
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2.4. Contemporary Understandings of Human Nature: Stephen R. L. Clark. This 
section will address the undeniably animal nature of Homo sapiens through the ideas of 
someone who both acknowledges the artificial nature of the perceived discontinuity 
between Homo sapiens from other species of ape, who as a result proposes a new way of 
understanding human nature. It will be observed how this attempt to come to terms with 
the animal nature of Homo sapiens, while still embracing the notion imago Dei, could 
result in a vastly different understanding of what being human means. 
In an essay about the reasons for the exclusion of other apes from humankind, 
Stephen R. L. Clark acknowledges the animal nature of Homo sapiens almost 
immediately. "Either," Clark begins, "we are simply products of evolutionary processes 
or we are not." Exploring the first of these two possibilities in his essay, Clark states 
that in light of the common ancestry all surviving apes share, any objective judge would 
have no choice but to consider Homo sapiens to be just one of several other species of 
ape.136 More than the resemblances the orang-utan, for example, and the member of the 
species Homo sapiens share to one another, both in appearance and cognitive abilities, it 
is the family relationship the two have together, along with the gorilla and the two species 
of chimpanzee, that force us to see all these creatures as members of the same kind. 
Clark notes that the differences that appear to distinguish each of these species need not 
necessarily force us to separate one kind from another. After all, he says, variations can 
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exist within a kind, such as the two surviving species of chimpanzee, for example. 
Also, species have not been understood to be fixed categories since the time of Darwin.138 
As individual organisms comprise any species of the animal kingdom and are 
considered to be of the same kind through shared characteristics, the point where 
accumulating variations in a creature's physiology make it different enough from its 
direct ancestors to classify it as some other kind of creature can be difficult to pin-point, 
especially as changes occur gradually over periods of thousands of years or more. 
Clark notes the existence of collections of interbreeding populations called 
Realgattungen, or ring species, such as groups of salmon and seagull capable of breeding 
with slightly different populations occupying nearby waters, but not populations a little 
further away.140 The existence of animal populations such as these leads Clark to suspect 
that all surviving species of animal are in fact Realgattungen. The intermediary 
transitions between each species surviving today, for whatever reason, simply died out, 
leaving gaps in what would otherwise be a gradual continuum. "Lose all the other dogs," 
Clark says, "and wolfhounds and chihuahuas would be unlikely conspecifics."141 This is 
exactly what happened to the primate species linking the chimpanzee, the gorilla, and 
Homo sapiens. 
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A necessary implication of this possibility is the notion that Homo sapiens and the 
other species of higher primates might, in addition to being sister species, be also 
different links in the same Realgattung. If species so closely related are, in the end, only 
varieties of the same kind, then the variations separating them are ultimately superficial, 
especially if all are equally Realgattungen linking together the same chain. If Homo 
sapiens are a human species, then in Clark's view there is little reason to think other 
members of the taxonomic family Hominidea shouldn't be either. 
But Clark is not content to claim humanity rests solely upon relation and common 
descent. He instead presents a different understanding stemming from his understanding 
of God. Believing human beings to exist in imago Dei, reflecting back God's nature as 
though they were "mirrors of the divine"142, he considers a human individual's ability to 
know and understand to be derivative of the Divine Reason it evolved to imitate. If a 
very young child of the species Homo sapiens embodies a lower intensity of the light of 
Reason than an adult orang-utan, then according to Clark, at that moment in the child's 
life, the orang-utan actually reflects the imago Dei more perfectly. Nevertheless, because 
the child still displays some aspects of rationality, even if only the first signs of it, the 
child too cannot be denied to exist in the Image of God, even though it may be to a lesser 
degree. As the child matures, the resemblance he or she bears to Clark's idea of God will 
come to be more perfectly realized, until that child surpasses the level of divinity 
possessed by the orang-utan. 
Biological relation is still important to Clark's understanding of humanity, 
however; because orang-utans, chimpanzees, gorillas, and the species Homo sapiens all 
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closely resemble one another, they share similar levels of intelligence and forms of 
behavior. If Homines sapientes tend to resemble God more than the members of any 
other animal lineage, and if other apes resemble Homo sapiens more than any other 
animal lineage, then other apes resemble God more than any other animal kind besides 
Homo sapiens. For Clark, relation to and descent from other human creatures offers a 
practical reason for asserting the human nature of a creature, though it is not an essential 
one. An intelligent tree, for example, possessing no animal ancestors at all, might be 
understood to be human, according to this idea. Clark is suggesting that we accept a 
trans-species hierarchy of humanity that never goes so far as to identify human nature 
with any particular species, but embraces a spectrum of images of God that extend across 
the entire living universe. 
Even as creatures from the Realgattung, Hominidea are, in Clark's words, able to 
"ape the Divine" more fully than any other animal population, Clark also notes that in the 
species Homo sapiens, some individuals embody the Divine Reason of God better than 
others.143 Clark would say that, though all Homines sapientes are human, people whom 
he designates to be "saints and sages" are the most human, as they more perfectly 
actualize the Divine Reason than the other members of their own species living alongside 
them.144 
Clark's views ultimately turn him away from an Aristotelian view of nature and 
back toward a more Platonic understanding of the world. While Aristotle set rigid 
boundaries not only between the animal species of the world but also between humans 
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and non- humans, Plato saw no need to make such distinctions. As Clark says, referring 
to Plato's dialogue, The Statesman, 
"Plato, after all, denied that it was sensible to contrast human and nonhuman 
things, creatures of our specific kind and others. We might as well divide the 
universe into cranes and noncranes. By his account (or at least the account 
developed from his writings), there are indeed real natures, but they are not 
identical with the things that partly remind us of them. Even we ourselves are not 
wholly identical with the Form of Humanity, though we are called to serve it. 
The Form of Humanity is the divine reason, and we are indeed more human, in 
this sense, insofar as we think and do as the divine reason requires."145 
If so many species share the same ancestors and so much in common 
physiologically, Clark is saying, then does drawing sharp distinctions between kinds 
really make any sense? Is one kind of creature really so different that we must separate it 
from all the rest of created nature? Can we understand such distinguished creatures apart 
from other related forms of life?146 Rather than draw a line between human and non-
human, and then attempt to determine the point at which creatures cease to be images of 
God, Clark would see all the life of creation differently. After all, if the spirit of God is 
everywhere, as Clark says, then every creature reflects God's nature, 
"in however tarnished a mirror. If we are apes, let us be apes together. If we are 
'apes' (as aping the Divine), let us acknowledge what our duty is as would-be 
saints and give the courtesy we owe to those from among whom we sprang. 
Either we evolved along with them, by the processes described elsewhere, or else 
we evolved, in part, to imitate a Divine Humanity. Neither theory licenses a 
radical disjunction between ourselves and other apes. Either may give us reason 
to esteem and serve the greater humankind."147 
2.5. Comparing Contemporary Understandings: van Huyssteen Revisited. The 





understanding that human existence reflects the image of God in varying degrees through 
every species of animal. In light of this, the more traditional understanding of van 
Huyssteen's shall now be reconsidered. Through contrasting the two understandings, we 
shall attempt to determine whether or not van Huyssteen is justified in holding to a more 
traditional understanding of humanity, and whether or not it is reasonable to identify 
humanity exclusively with the animal species Homo sapiens. 
The understanding of human nature presented by Clark is very different than that 
possessed by more traditional Western views. These traditional views typically attempt 
to identify humanity as something distinct and separate from all other forms of animal 
existence, in light of its divine origin. Clark's view is nothing if not inclusive, making 
great efforts to avoid speciesism, and extend the honor of human existence to as many 
forms of life as possible. 
While both Clark and van Huyssteen believe in God and are even fellow Gifford 
Lecturers, both possess sharply contrasting understandings of human nature and the state 
of its existence in the world: Clark's view of human nature is simple and inclusive, while 
van Huyssteen's is specific and exclusive. The conception of human nature offered by 
van Huyssteen in Chapter One, together with the one arising from Clark's in this chapter, 
both appeal for the same reason: each is highly comprehensive, attempting to offer a clear 
understanding of what being human means. Both recognize Homo sapiens' animal 
nature and evolutionary history, and neither attempts to ignore that nature. 
In light of these many similarities between Homo sapiens and other animal 
species, together with the nearly identical biological nature they all possess, emphasizing 
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any distinctions that set Homo sapiens apart may in the end be of no use to anyone 
attempting to understand human nature. This is certainly the case with Clark, who as we 
have seen would instead embrace the kindred nature present in every species of animal as 
a reason to assert its humanity. While not considering Clark specifically, van Huyssteen 
addresses a similar attitude to Clark's, before contrasting it with his own: 
"Precisely the fact that many other animals clearly have so much in common with 
humans has led some to conclude that it is more important to understand what 
unites us with rather than what divides us from closely related species. Yet others 
feel strongly that it is precisely the fact of human uniqueness that we need to 
define carefully. In reality, of course, these two interests are effectively identical, 
since we cannot understand whether we really are unique, and how unique we 
may be, without also knowing the full extent of what we share with our closest 
relatives."148 
Van Huyssteen believes that even if Homo sapiens and other animal species possess 
nearly identical natures, if Homo sapiens are the only human species in the world, there 
will nevertheless be something that distinguishes them. Even if that distinction is a small 
one, it is significant because it allows for a human nature to exist alongside an animal 
nature. So while Clark would widen the boundaries of humanity to include other species 
outside the genus Homo, van Huyssteen prefers to restrict humanity solely to Homo 
sapiens. 
Van Huyssteen, it may be recalled, summarizes his understanding of what 
Homines sapientes (and human beings) are through a list of attributes, including the 
species' status as the final surviving member of the genus Homo, the bipedal stance, the 
possession of a large and complicated brain, and through this possession the ability to 
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think, plan, imagine, and create abstract symbols, art, and religion. In addition to these 
attributes, van Huyssteen has more to say about the embodied aspect of humanity, in light 
of ethical and religious views analyzed in Alone in the World?: 
"vulnerability as human beings is complex precisely because we are 
multidimensional beings. As organic beings we are vulnerable to physical injury, 
disease, pain, and death. As social beings we are vulnerable to social 
incompatibility, social suffering, and oppressive social systems. We are 
vulnerable to the experience of suffering in very distinctive ways because we are 
personal, self-aware beings." 15° 
Through his enthusiastic embracement of the idea that the body is essential for human 
existence, van Huyssteen notes while discussing Maclntyre that some mammals display 
capacities in their relationships that allow them to share much of what is necessary for 
human existence: 
"Maclntyre puts it well: our kinship to the dolphin and the chimpanzee is a 
kinship not only with the animality of the body, but also with respect to forms of 
life like the skills and social behaviors of our sister species in the animal world. 
Like dolphins and chimpanzees, we humans need social relationships to 
flourish."151 
Because embodied animal nature is so important for human existence, it might 
seem possible that van Huyssteen will in the end be forced to make concessions that 
bring his view closer to Clark's, and see human nature reflected to some degree in other 
species besides Homo sapiens. Consider the examples offered in this chapter already 
such as Miles's language experiments with Chantek, or the recognition of Homo sapiens' 
membership in the Realgattung, Hominidea with other primate species. If other animals 
are of the same kind and possess the same significant abilities, then the assertion that 
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Homo sapiens is a wholly unique kind of creature has been effectively challenged. 
However, van Huyssteen's view is saved from being reduced to just another version of 
Clark's through the existence of one aspect that nevertheless remains particular to Homo 
sapiens: the capacity to possess religious thoughts, endure religious experiences, and the 
ability to have a relationship with God: 
"A careful analysis of Genesis 1:26-28 revealed that these verses recognize the 
primal human symbolically as the first human and as the significant forerunner of 
humanity, but more importantly as the link that defines the relationship between 
God and humanity. Against this background every human is created in the image 
of God, and these ancient texts are clear expressions of the uniqueness of human 
beings as walking representations of God on earth. In this ancient creation story 
we humans are seen as the culminating achievement of God: alone of all 
creatures, we are said to be made in God's image and invited into a personal 
relationship with God. In this very theological sense, then, we are indeed 'alone 
in the world'."152 
While Clark described rationality as the way a creature lived in the image of God, van 
Huyssteen understands it to instead mean relationality. This idea, which van Huyssteen 
says is consistent with both the contextual cultural understanding and original intentions 
of the Old Testament authors, 
"does not necessarily imply that nature as a whole should now be seen as created 
in the image of God, but for theological reasons that are fair and compassionate, 
• 1 ^^ 
limits the notion of the imago Dei to Homo sapiens" 
This is perfectly in accordance with what Ratzinger more simply stated in his homily on 
human nature: "They are most profoundly themselves when they discover their relation to 
their Creator."154 
152
 Ibid., 314. 
153
 Ibid., 322. 
154
 Ratzinger, Joseph. In the Beginning: A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall, 
trans. Boniface Ramsey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 1995). 48. 
64 
Thus, while van Huyssteen acknowledges Homo sapiens' connection to nature and 
other forms of life, his view emphasizes different aspects of the nature of Homo sapiens 
than Clark's. According to van Huyssteen, a natural capacity for a religious 
understanding of the world sets Homo sapiens apart from other creatures in a way like 
nothing else.155 This religious capacity is significant because of the non-empirical nature 
of the objects of religion. Divinity, if it exists, does so beyond the natural world, outside 
of physical experience and the sense perception which both Homo sapiens and other 
animals employ to survive and thrive in the world. Nevertheless, these objects continue 
to be beheld, felt, and experienced by species able to "code the nonvisible", in van 
Huyssteen's words, and offer an interpretation of that experience. The stunning 
Lascaux cave paintings left by the ancient inhabitants of what is today southwestern 
France testify to the presence of this capacity in Homo sapiens hundreds of thousands of 
years ago, and its importance in the lives of the people who created them: 
"Within a shamanistic context the Upper Paleolithic subterranean passages and 
the chambers were therefore places that uniquely provided the opportunity for 
close contact with, and even penetration of, a very specific spiritual tier of the 
cosmos. And this hallucinatory, spiritual world, exemplified by its painted and 
engraved imagery, was thus invested with materiality and was precisely situated 
cosmologically. It certainly did not exist merely in human minds; the spiritual 
world was there, tangible and material, and some could empirically verify it by 
entering the caves and seeing for themselves the 'fixed' visions of the spirit 
animals that empowered the shamans of the community."158 
These attempts to touch the world beyond continue to this day: consider the Cro-Magnon 
shaman just described by van Huyssteen, working by torchlight deep in a cave in 
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Lascaux, and then consider artist Adolf Hyla in the years following World War II, re-
creating the vision of St. Faustina Kowalska in his painting of the Divine Mercy. Each 
displays in his own time and cultural context a parallel expression of the same capacity, a 
power that separated his species from the rest of nature as much today as it did 40,000 
years ago. 
Of course, van Huyssteen remains open to criticism by Clark, in light of one of 
his important observations. Clark understands that there were no separate species among 
the taxonomic family Hominidae, but only a range of superficially differing populations. 
Proposing instead that we consider the entire group of higher primates, orang-utans and 
chimpanzees, gorillas and Homo sapiens, to be varying populations of a single kind, 
Clark challenges Homo sapiens to abandon its cultural tendency to separate itself from 
and deny its animal nature.159 Though he acknowledges Homo sapiens'' relation to other 
animal species, van Huyssteen does not consider this problem as he asserts the human 
uniqueness of Homo sapiens alone. He also fails, in light of Clark's observation that 
some animals exhibit more intelligent behavior than some very young or handicapped 
Homines sapientes, to consider why young or disabled members of the species should 
still be considered human. Also, the failure of very young or disabled Homines sapientes 
to pray or understand such theological ideas of God is never addressed. These questions 
shall be considered in the next chapter. 
Leaving these questions behind for a moment, we shall accept van Huyssteen's 
understanding in order to consider the sort of God he understands human beings to exist 
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in the image of. The understanding that Homo sapiens' humanity lies in its ability to 
have a loving relationship with God allows van Huyssteen to assert that of all the 
intelligent species of animal alive on the earth, only Homo sapiens is able to be 
accurately described as human. Therefore, it is not intelligence or the ability to reason 
that allows a creature to exist in imago Dei, but the ability to love as God loves. The 
following section shall consider two of the consequences of this realization: that God is 
not primarily a rational mind, as Clark describes, but a loving person. 
2.6. The Relational Idea of God: Bernard Lonergan, S.J. The following section shall 
investigate the understanding that God is primarily relational, together with van 
Huyssteen's claim that Homo sapiens is unique in its ability to exist in a relationship with 
divinity. This shall be done by examining Jesuit philosopher and theologian Bernard 
Lonergan's understanding of how human beings came to experience God in their lives. 
According to Bernard Lonergan, the first human awareness of God comes not 
through reasonable deduction of first causes, but through an overpowering feeling of 
love, subjectively experienced by the individual.160 One constantly recurring aspect of 
human life, Lonergan says, present throughout the history of Homo sapiens, is the 
phenomenon of religious experience.161 Lonergan believes that religious experiences 
allowed Homo sapiens to know divinity long before philosophers such as Aristotle 
deduced the existence of any kind of uncaused first cause. 




Lonergan is not alone in his belief. Similarly, philosopher of religion and 
pluralistic theologian John Hick has noted that while there exist and have existed 
countless religious traditions throughout human history, the love of God has always been 
at the heart of each, and has always inspired all of humanity to find hope in its 
salvation.163 The Jewish philosopher Martin Buber also understood relational 
experiences to be the only way through which God makes Himself known to earthly 
human beings.164 Lonergan concurs with both Buber and Hick when he notes that for all 
the varieties of human culture influencing those experiences as they occur to individuals, 
one aspect remains fundamental and universal: 
"Underneath the many forms and prior to the many aberrations some have found 
that there exists an unrestricted being in love, a mystery of love and awe, a being 
grasped by ultimate concern, a happiness that has a determinate content but no 
intellectually apprehended object. Such people will ask, With whom are we in 
love? So [...] there arises the question of God."165 
Lonergan notes that all theology and religious understandings of God are rooted 
not in philosophical understandings, but in religious experience.166 While philosophy's 
task may be to analyze a culture's belief in God and the reasons for it in order to 
understand it, religious experience always underlies it, and it is through religion that the 
idea of God is principally conveyed to the world up to the present time. Moreover, 
Lonergan observes, a philosophy of God requires a cultural atmosphere rich in religious 
awareness in order to flourish. The relational nature of God is the foundation underlying 
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all other ways in which the divine is understood to exist and how it is to be described. 
The human experience of the love of God, which is for Lonergan prior to all other 
ways of knowing Him, reveals to us God's existence to be most fundamentally a personal 
one. Lonergan believes this is because of God's demonstrated ability to relate, and he 
states that personhood results from relationships: 
"From the 'we' of the parents comes the symbiosis of mother and child. From the 
'we' of the parents and the symbiosis of mother and child comes the 'we' of the 
family. Within the 'we' of the family emerges the T of the child. In other words 
the person is not the primordial fact. What is primordial is the community."168 
According to this understanding, God is not primarily rational or an ultimate mind, but 
instead a loving person, relational and extending His love beyond Himself to creatures 
capable of recognizing His offering and returning it back to Him. Both Judaism and 
Christianity demonstrate a similar understanding; though He wore many masks, acting at 
times as a warrior, judge, king, shepherd, or husband, the God of the Old Testament was 
most certainly relational. His covenant with the Israelites (a unifying relationship, like a 
marriage) served as the ultimate example of this aspect of His nature.169 The New 
Testament cast an additional light on the Old Testament understanding of God with the 
revelation that God is a loving father, indicated by Jesus with the intimate address, abba 
("daddy").170 
In a statement that van Huyssteen would most assuredly agree with, Lonergan 
says that the knowledge of God results from an experience of the love of God, felt 
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"with all one's heart, with all one's mind, with all one's soul, and with all one's 
171 
strength, and from it flows the love on one's neighbor as one's self." 
The Trinitarian understanding of God found in Christianity describes a loving 
1TJ 
relationship between a Father, His Son, and a third person, the Love itself. This 
understanding, St. Thomas Aquinas recognized, arose not through philosophical reason, 
but through a revelation by God, allows for God to exist in a personal relationship within 
the divine nature prior to the emergence of human beings in His Creation.173 This 
eternal relationship, existing before the universe was made, demonstrates how the love 
and personhood of God is the source of all love and relations found on the earth, for they 
were created in the image of this personhood. In imago Dei. 
It might be understood, then, that human animals are unique among their sister 
species, for they alone are aware of the source of their loving relationships. Human 
animals alone have been granted the ability to directly know the Lover who called them 
and all the rest of the world into being. Because theology tells us God exists in three 
persons united in a single familial relation, God knows and loves God. Because human 
beings also know and love God, they resemble God in a way that no other animal species 
in Creation does. 
2.7. Conclusion. The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the nature of human 
nature, with two purposes in mind. The first was in order to determine first whether or 
not humanity could be understood to exist in more than one species. The second was to 
understand how a human nature reflects the image of the God who created it. What 
171
 Ibid., 58. 
172
 Hahn, Scott. First Comes Love. (New York: Image, 2002). 42-43. 
173
 Aquinas, St. Thomas. Aquinas's Shorter Summa [Compendium of Theology], trans. Cyril Vollert, S.J. 
(1947; Manchester: Sophia Institute, 2002). 35. 
70 
unites the two questions and allows us to investigate them together is a third question: the 
question of the nature of God. Understanding God as a mind, such as the Divine Reason 
described by Clark, offers us one answer to the question of what kind of creature "apes 
the divine" and imitates God. On the other hand, understanding God as a Lover in a 
community of love offers us quite another. 
Only how one understands God will determine whether the rational God 
described by Clark or the personal God described by Lonergan and van Huyssteen will be 
chosen as the God Homo sapiens more perfectly imitates. A Christian philosopher 
would, it certainly seems, choose the second understanding, for his or her faith depends 
on the existence of a God able to reach out to the world and call it to be in a loving 
relationship with Him. If our faith, historical milieu, and cultural context take us along 
this path, then we have found a way in which Homo sapiens is a unique species. If the 
ability to have loving relationships, knowledge of God, and the power to imitate God are 
what make Homo sapiens a human species, then humanity cannot be said to be possessed 
by individuals from species lacking the ability to know God. 
This realization leads to at least two troubling questions. The first follows from 
Clark's assertion that all apes, including chimpanzees, gorillas, and Homo sapiens, are 
not really separate species at all. If all the "great apes" are, beneath their superficial, 
external features, really all members of the same kind, the uniqueness of one population 
over another becomes more difficult to rationalize. If we cannot really be sure that Homo 
sapiens are a separate and distinct group to begin with, how can we follow van Huyssteen 
in saying that Homo sapiens is the sole possessor of human nature? 
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The second troublesome question also has to do with identifying Homo sapiens as 
the only human species of creature in the world: even if Homo sapiens are the only 
species existing in imago Dei, how can we defend the humanity of Homines sapientes 
that are unable to exhibit loving or religious behavior? Consider the handicapped, the 
very young, or those suffering from illnesses such as autism. Though incapable of 
expressing the behavior that demonstrates an individual to be a human being, very few 
would deny these individuals to be human. To assert their humanity without questioning 
the strictly animal nature of intelligent, language-using species such as orang-utans seems 
problematic. Lord Monboddo asserted that speech was not necessary for humanity. 
Could it be the same case with religious behavior, after all? These questions shall be 
considered in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Three - The Biological and Spiritual Uniqueness of Homo sapiens. 
The first two chapters have suggested that even though human life depends on, and is 
rooted in, a biological animal nature, human nature is something more: it rests in the 
ability to experience a relationship with God, an awareness of supernatural reality, and 
the use of religious behavior to engage and interact with this other reality. It might seem, 
however, that van Huyssteen almost too neatly and easily asserts that humanity is only to 
be found in Homo sapiens. 
Even though all mammals may share, in varying degrees, a bodily existence, 
social habits, and cognitive abilities, it has been noted with van Huyssteen that only 
members of the species Homo sapiens display a capacity for religious behavior. 
Unfortunately, as young children and the mentally handicapped demonstrate, not every 
member of the species Homo sapiens necessarily displays religious behavior. Also, as 
Clark pointed out, Homo sapiens may not be as biologically distinct from other species of 
mammals as those of its kind tend to believe. In this chapter, I shall attempt to consider 
the challenges facts such as these offer us in my attempt to understand Homo sapiens as a 
uniquely human species, created in imago Dei. 
3.1. The Problem of Species. The problem of species is an important one to consider 
when attempting to determine what sort of uniqueness is possessed by Homo sapiens. 
The methods through which species are determined taxonomically may vary, depending 
on the scientific field doing the classifying or the cultural attitude of the classifier.174 
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When considering paleontology and long-extinct animals, the amount of time being 
considered may also affect the way species are understood. 
The question of whether or not species even exist was suggested in the essay by 
Richard Dawkins, considered preceding chapter. Dawkins recognizes all forms of 
animal life to be a part of a single, enormous, ring species, punctuated only by the 
arbitrary extinctions of the individuals bridging one interbreeding group with another. 
A slightly weaker view of this idea comes from Clark, who proposed that though 
extinctions have left our world with numerous kinds of animals, the boundaries 
encompassing those kinds may actually be wider than most Homo sapiens tend to 
believe. Speculating, it may be recalled, that because greyhounds and chihuahuas are 
of the same species, in spite of the physiological differences distinguishing them, Clark 
wonders if the same might be true of Homo sapiens and chimpanzees. Such speculations 
are not limited to the animal world, but also to the ways botanists classify plants.178 
We also read in the last chapter Clark's suggestion that Homo sapiens1 distinction 
as a separate species from other primates might have more to do with a cultural 
anthropocentrism than an actual biological difference. This possibility offers a further 
reason to question drawing a line between Homo sapiens and other organisms. Even 
one discipline of study to another. Biology and ecology, for example, each understand marine life in very 
different ways. 
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while Homo sapiens may be identifiable as a specific enough group of organisms, and 
even if a capacity possessed by no other creature can be found among members of the 
species Homo sapiens, a satisfying case has not yet been made for asserting Homo 
sapiens' uniqueness for a number of reasons. First, if little differentiates Homo sapiens 
from other primate species, as Clark notes, and if chimpanzees and orang-utans have so 
far failed to demonstrate the capacity for religious relationships that most members of the 
species Homo sapiens possess, then what can be said of Homines sapientes who fail to 
exhibit this religious capacity? Are they still human, and if they are, then why not 
consider other primates to be for the same reason? 
While Clark's broad understanding of human nature offers us an answer to this 
question, that answer will not satisfy anyone who has religious reasons to believe human 
nature exists only in Homo sapiens. 
The following sections shall attempt to demonstrate that the surviving members of 
the species Homo sapiens possesses a biological uniqueness that sets it apart from other 
species comprising the Realgattung which Clark referred to as "greater humankind".179 
This shall be done first by embracing the fact that Homo sapiens shares an extremely 
close relation with other primate species, before offering reasons to support the belief that 
Homo sapiens nevertheless exists apart from them as well. 
3.2. Looking for a Biological Uniqueness: the Challenge. The taxonomic family 
Hominidea has, over the course of the past twenty million years until the present day, 
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Humanity, eds. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 123. 
75 
evolved into four distinct genera of animal kinds. The species belonging to the genera 
Pongo, Gorilla, Pan, and Homo (orang-utans, gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos, and 
Homo sapiens) slowly evolved into separate kinds within one larger family, each linked 
by many generations of intermediaries. Because all these species are descended from the 
same ancestors, it is still possible to view all of them as a single kind of creature. This is 
exactly what Clark does.181 
In an essay discussing what he believes to be the mistake of identifying humanity 
only with Homo sapiens, anthropologist R. I. M. Dunbar discusses the behavioral 
similarities chimpanzees share with Homo sapiens, in addition to their physiological 
resemblance: 
"[T]he chimpanzees share with us a number of physiological characteristics that 
have not been found in other species. One of these is the ability to engage in 
pretend play; another is to be able to see the world from another individual's point 
of view. Some human beings (namely autistic individuals) lack both these 
abilities, yet we are happy to treat them (quite rightly, of course!) as human. How 
much more deserving then must be the chimpanzee's case for equal treatment!" 
From a scientific point of view, then, if considering both biology and intelligent 
behavior, it can be reasonably claimed that both Homo sapiens and chimpanzees are set 
apart from one another only by superficial differences. This can be done in light of the 
fact that the DNA of the two species differs genetically by less than 1.6 percent. The 
biological natures of both species are almost nearly identical, as are their ancestral 
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histories.183 The higher primate species surviving today remain extremely closely 
related, as evidenced by the short genetic distances separating each: a mere 0.7 percent 
difference distinguishes the DNA of chimpanzees and bonobos from one another, while a 
3.6 percent difference separates the orang-utan from the chimpanzee. Chimpanzees, it 
should also be noted, are more closely related to Homo sapiens than they are to either 
orang-utans or their fellow-African cousins, gorillas.184 Put this way, 98.4 percent of 
Homo sapiens^ genes are, "just normal chimp genes". 
Yet in spite of these scientific facts, I nevertheless wish to demonstrate that the 
members of the species Homo sapiens share a significant difference from their fellow 
primate species. If a biological fact may be found that allows us to identify Homo 
sapiens as a species truly set apart from other species in the taxonomic family 
Hominidea, then we shall have a reason to abandon the claim of both Clark and Dunbar 
that all primate species are ultimately simply members of the same kind. This shall be 
done by examining the biological relationship uniting the surviving members of the 
species. 
3.3. Looking for a Biological Uniqueness: The Family Homo sapiens. In his essay, 
"What's in a Classification," Dunbar tells us: 
"The biological reality is that the great apes are just populations of animals that 
differ only slightly more than their degree of genetic relatedness to you and me 
than to other populations of humans living elsewhere in the world. They just look 
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a bit different to those other populations we call 'human', but not all that different, 
and by no means as different as, say, spiders do." 
Dunbar acknowledges, together with others such as Clark, the tendency of Homo 
sapiens to separate themselves from other primate species, in spite of their nearly 
identical biological natures. One of the reasons explaining this tendency, he proposes, is 
rooted in close physiological resemblance shared by all Homines sapientes, regardless of 
what part of the world they might come from: 
"This remarkable similarity between humans may help to explain why we draw 
the line so tightly around ourselves. In trying to differentiate between 'them and 
us', we observe that the differences in appearance between members of our own 
family and other humans from all parts of the world is relatively small compared 
with the apparent gulf between ourselves and those species that seem to be most 
similar to us (namely, chimpanzees and gorillas)."187 
Even though generations spent living on different continents and regions fostered 
superficial physical distinctions between some populations within the species Homo 
sapiens, Dunbar notes that Homines sapientes nevertheless share more in common both 
genetically and physiologically with each other than any other species on the planet. 
This similarity is easily explained when considering the relatively brief history of Homo 
sapiens: the species first appeared as little as 500,000 years ago.189 More than this, all 
members of the species Homo sapiens surviving today share an even more recent point of 
origin: a common female ancestor who lived just 150,000 years ago (or, as Dunbar notes, 
"a mere 5,000 human generations ago!").190 The fact that every surviving member of the 
species Homo sapiens shares such a recent common ancestor means, Dunbar says, that all 
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Homines sapientes not only physically resemble one another more than any other 
organism, but are more closely related to one another than are all the chimpanzees or 
gorillas in the world.191 As a result, the resemblance uniting all Homines sapientes is not 
only the result of their membership in the same species, but their membership in the same 
family. 
While Homo sapiens may be part of the taxonomic family of Hominidea, together 
with other primate species, Homines sapientes can also in their present state be 
understood to be of one family more than any other primate species. It should, however, 
be noted that this unique relationship among the members of the species Homo sapiens 
was not always the case. The common female ancestor of all surviving Homines 
sapientes is, for example, not to be understood as exactly identical to the biblical Eve 
simply because she was not the first woman. The Mitochondrial Eve, as she has come to 
be called,192 would have been herself a daughter, granddaughter, and great granddaughter 
of other women who lived before her, during a time when not all Homo sapiens shared a 
single common ancestor. As Michael Ruse notes, using an analogy: 
"I am descended from my great grandmother, as is my sister, but we are 
descended from seven other people as well. This is not the way of the literal 
Adam and Eve story of Genesis."193 
Biologically speaking, then, Homo sapiens was no different from other primate species in 
this regard before the life of this particular woman. During the subsequent generations 
following her life, as this woman's children mated with other members of the Homo 
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sapiens population, the entire species came to be united together as a single family. 
Because of a single shared ancestor, Homines sapientes possess a unity that genetically 
ties together all its members more closely than those of any other primate species, as well 
as sharing between themselves more physiological similarities. Because they are all the 
children of the children of the Mitochondrial Eve, the surviving Homines sapientes enjoy 
a unique familial relation that sets them further apart from the members of all other 
similar species on the planet. Clark, as we saw in the last chapter, presents the idea that 
Homo sapiens is really an indistinct group within a larger group of other indistinct groups 
of primates. 
The idea that Homo sapiens presently exists as a single interrelated population 
descended from the same individual ancestor offers us a reason to assert the species' 
biological uniqueness after all. In light of this, I shall from this point on refer to the 
communities of presently- surviving Homines sapientes today as the Family Homo 
sapiens. I understand the Family to be a distinct population within the species Homo 
sapiens, a group which once included the now-extinct populations of Homo sapiens that 
were not a part of this family. 
In addition to the biological uniqueness this relation gives the Family Homo 
sapiens, it may also provide a possible reason to assert that the attributes deemed 
necessary for both personhood and humanity are present in all surviving Homines 
sapientes, regardless of whether or not they are obvious. It may be the case that a child 
or a handicapped Homo sapiens may fail to use language or exhibit signs of both self-
awareness or religious behavior. Nevertheless, the fact of the close relation and the 
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significant biological resemblance all Homines sapientes possess offer reasons to suspect 
that the ability to display a human nature is nevertheless always present, even if it is 
hidden by some physical or developmental immaturity or impairment. 
While some may be satisfied by this, for others, the observable fact of an adult 
orang-utan's ability to demonstrate intelligent behavior might be more significant than the 
unproven possibility of a very young child's potential to do so. As a result, they would 
still be skeptical of any attempt to prove the humanity of the young child as stronger than 
the humanity of an orang-utan. The same would also be true of Clark, as we have read in 
the previous chapter. Clark, it may be recalled, through equating human nature with the 
possession of intelligence, believed himself able to describe animals as more or less 
human depending upon the intelligence they each displayed. While being related to 
typically intelligent species might make the future human existence of a newly-conceived 
creature more likely, membership into a certain biological kind does not absolutely 
guarantee humanity, in Clark's mind. 
In this section, a unique biological relationship has been identified that allows us 
to proclaim a physiological uniqueness for the Family Homo sapiens. However, in light 
of the difficulty faced by defenders of the humanity of both unborn children or the 
handicapped, who cannot demonstrate "human" behavior to be possessed by either, it 
must be considered whether or not science provides all the proper methods of 
investigating the phenomenon of human uniqueness, at least as far as situations where the 
humanity of an organism is unobservable and questionable. In the following section, one 
thinker will attempt to explain all of human nature through one method of study, 
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attempting to accept both scientific and theological understandings simultaneously. His 
success might offer an answer to the challenge facing those who would defend the 
humanity of the young, ill or disabled. 
3.4. An Attempt at Reconciliation: Michael Ruse. Michael Ruse makes an explicit 
attempt to reconcile the Genesis accounts of the origin of humanity with the 
paleontological record, hoping to uncover an historical process that can be shown to 
correspond with a theological understanding of how the human Family emerged out of 
the animal species Homo sapiens. He does this even in spite of Ratzinger's claim that the 
two disciplines of science and theology describe different truths, a belief that allows both 
understandings to separately coexist. Van Huyssteen says, on the other hand, that a view 
able to make use of both points of view simultaneously will be more satisfying for 
someone seeking a fuller understanding of human nature. 
Ruse faces a difficult task, as he is committed to a naturalist understanding of 
human nature. Though opposed to van Huyssteen in this regard, Ruse's attempt 
nevertheless offers us some valuable ideas that help us to better understand the nature of 
human nature, and what makes Homo sapiens a theologically unique species. Ruse's 
refusal to accept anything but a naturalistic Darwinian understanding of human nature, 
however, means that he will inevitably reach a conclusion that is both quite different 
from van Huyssteen's. His thoughts will nevertheless be considered, for the ideas he 
chooses not to consider have some important things to tell a multidisciplinarian open to 
different understandings of how human beings originated. 
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Ruse begins his attempts to reconcile scientific and theological views of human 
nature into one single discipline at the very beginning, going back to the opening chapter 
of Genesis and attempting to view a Darwinian understanding in light of it. He notes 
that the theological understanding that the human Family Homo sapiens descended from 
one original couple seems the most troubling to those who would attempt to reconcile 
Christianity with evolution and biological science.194 Some would accept the story of 
Adam and Eve to be entirely symbolic; van Huyssteen, as mentioned, offers the 
suggestion that Adam and Eve simply represent the first group of hominids to exhibit 
religious awareness and behavior.195 The book of Genesis tells us that human life began 
when God "breathed" His spirit into the physical form of Adam. If one insists that the 
divine life of God entered into particular members of an already existing species at a 
certain moment in time, then we may have found an explanation that is really quite 
compatible with the theological account offered in the book of Genesis. Unfortunately, 
Michael Ruse finds difficulty in accepting such a position, as far as science is concerned. 
He says that it is possible that God introduced intelligence into a particular pair of 
Homines sapientes simply by divine edict, therefore leaving any further need for 
explanation irrelevant.196 However, to have the transition from animal to human occur in 
this way seems calls into question the nature of this first couple's most immediate 
ancestors, as Ruse notes: 
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"Darwinian biology suggests that intelligence (and as we shall see, related 
freedom and moral awareness) would be possessed by the parent generation and 
the contemporary generation and those of the next generations not descended 
from the pair. So on what basis can we declare them not to have been made in 
God's image?"197 
As a result of this question, Ruse claims to have reached a dead end in his attempt to 
harmonize these two understandings of the origin of humanity, forcing him to investigate 
other, less orthodox explanations of the origins of human nature, as we shall see below. 
Ruse ends up conceding that a reductionist view of reality like Darwinism cannot lead 
one to a non-reductionistic view such as Christianity without making what he describes 
as an ontological leap "in the presence of an ontological difference", here citing Pope 
John Paul II.198 
In light of what we have covered in the preceding chapter, we might observe 
Ruse's error: his viewing of intelligence as the defining feature of human nature. 
Together with this, he proposes that human beings exist in imago Dei because they are 
intelligent as God is intelligent. As noted in the last chapter, intelligence and rationality 
can be found in other species besides Homo sapiens, not only in other primates such as 
chimpanzees, but in less closely related mammals such as dolphins.199 While the 
intelligence of other mammals may not be equal to that typically possessed by Homo 
sapiens, it can be, especially if considering individuals who are very young or mentally 
impaired. In cases such as these, animals such as Chantek can actually surpass young or 
handicapped Homines sapientes in terms of intellectual ability, validly raising the 
question of who should be considered more human. We may recall Clark's attempt to 
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blur the boundaries of humanity by not tying it to every member any one particular 
primate population. But if intelligence is not the ultimate means through which an 
animal lives the life of God in the world, then Ruse's objection to Genesis in light of 
Darwinian science ("on what basis can we declare them not to have been made in God's 
image?"200) is less problematic. So long as members of the Family Homo sapiens know 
God and strive to live in imitation of the divine life, then the life of God, in the words of 
Lonergan, "flows the love on one's neighbor as oneself," entering the world through 
loving relationships.201 
Ruse errs a second time by misidentifying the external signs of the fruits of the 
life of God with an intangible force or power knowable only through theological 
investigation. Understanding intellect to be the means through which humanity 
resembles God, he understands that the human soul must be a "thinking reality". The 
question has already been proposed whether or not mentally handicapped or very young 
Homines sapientes are understood to be human beings, regardless of how well they are 
able to think. Could the same be true of religious awareness and behavior? Could a 
member of the species Homo sapiens, one mentally incapable of comprehending the 
existence of supernatural realities due to some impairment or illness, be denied to exist as 
a human being? 
Though we can accept, in light of van Huyssteen's understanding of what human 
beings are, that religious awareness and behavior are signs of human life, we need not 
believe that a capacity for religious behavior alone make an individual human. To do this 
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would be to fall victim to the same mistake Ruse commits. If religious behavior exists 
because an unobservable, supernatural aspect already resides within the creature, an 
object of theological and not scientific knowledge, then we may understand that a divine 
spiritual aspect is what ultimately underlies human nature. Religious behavior, we 
realize, is really just a possible consequence of human existence, and not the cause of 
human existence in an animal. 
This of course leads both to the question of the nature of this spiritual aspect, as 
well as how it historically came to reside within the members of the species Homo 
sapiens. In considering the nature of the human soul, Ruse tells us that there are two 
ways of understanding it in the Christian tradition: 
"One is a kind of Augustinian position, in turn Platonic, which sees the soul as 
something more or less distinct, in a substance sense, from the body. Augustine 
depends strongly on the reading of 'breath', a physical thing, in his exegesis of 
Genesis: 'God fashioned man out of the dust of the earth and gave him a soul... 
This he did either by implanting in him, by breathing on him, a soul which he had 
already made, or rather by willing that the actual breath which he produced when 
he breathed on him should be the soul of the man. For to breathe is to produce a 
breath.' [...] However, this is not the only position for the Christian, nor even 
today is it the official Catholic position. The official position rather is that of 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, and he was heavily influenced not by Plato but by 
Aristotle. And never more so, given the influence of De Anima, than in his 
discussion of the soul. For Aristotle/Aquinas, the human soul - identified with the 
intellectual faculty, which makes a human being a living human being - is not a 
thing, in the sense of a material substance. It is rather much more a principle of 
ordering or what, in Aristotelian terms, is called the 'form'. It is something real 
and can act as a kind of cause - Aquinas speaks of'actuating', but it is not a 
substance."202 
Ruse forsakes the dualistic Augustinian conception of body and soul as separate 
substances. Preferring a more naturalistic point of view, Ruse finds more promise in 
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Aquinas' understanding of the human soul as the ordering of biological information 
which allows Homo sapiens to exist in an intelligent way. The structure possessed by 
Homo sapiens that allows the species to live and move and think, Ruse understands, is 
therefore also what makes the species unique: 
"All organisms have souls as such: this is what makes them living. Only humans 
have 'intellectual souls.' This is the image of God."203 
Unfortunately, this leads to a problem Ruse is unable to pass over: the theological notion 
of traducianism, which he describes as the understanding that the human soul is passed 
onto human children through their parents.204 One of the primary champions of this idea 
was St. Augustine, who understood it to serve as the method through which the sin of 
Adam was passed on to his descendants.205 If traducianism is the case, Ruse says, and if 
we are to incorporate this idea into Darwinism, then it follows that that a primitive sort of 
human soul was to some degree present in Homo sapiens1 earliest ancestors, and that it 
developed into a fully human soul as the species evolved. 
It should be noted that Ruse is offering a modified version of St. Augustine's 
understanding, which both accepts that human nature is passed on from parent to child, 
but also that human nature developed slowly through a process of spiritual evolution. 
Thus both physical and spiritual realities were (and are) subject to evolutionary 
processes. 
203
 Ibid., SI. It should be noted that Ruse is using the word "soul" in the Thomistic sense, as a synonym for 
"form". 
204
 Ibid., 77. 
205
 Hill, Jonathon. The History of Christian Thought. (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2003). 85-86. 
87 
It might also be noted that traducianism, at least the version Ruse considers 
ascribing to, also has much in common with Aristotle's understanding of the three kinds 
of living soul, but goes further than Aristotle by describing a continuous array of 
intermediary degrees between each stage. It may also be noted the similarity such a view 
has with Clark, who described a continuum of more-or-less human souls within a number 
of interrelated species. 
The biological continuity of evolution and the spiritual continuity of traducianism 
suggests a natural progression from animal to human nature, a continuity that allows for a 
number of intermediary species to share in the divine life by virtue of their intellectual 
similarity to Homo sapiens. Yet as Ruse notes, 
"Unfortunately, this belief or escape route [traducianism] runs afoul of another 
part of Christian theology—Catholic theology at least—namely that animals, 
though alive, do not have (rational) souls. They do not mirror the divine. [...] We 
seem to have reached an impasse."206 
Though it leads to an ontological disjunction between Homo sapiens and other 
primate species, including the surviving Family Homo sapiens' most immediate 
ancestors, the only solution to Ruse's impasse is to reconsider the Platonic model he 
abandoned. Though it is not possible for a scientific naturalist such as Ruse to accept this 
(if he wishes to remain a naturalist), it seems to be the only way to avoid the problems he 
mentions without drastically compromising theological understandings of human creation 
and nature. 
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As we have now seen, equating intelligence with the human soul inevitably leads 
to an irreconcilable conflict between asserting a strong human uniqueness for Homo 
sapiens, while acknowledging the characteristics Homo sapiens shares with other 
animals. This is especially apparent when we confront examples of intelligent behavior 
in other forms of animal life.207 Understanding the attribute that allows human beings to 
exist in imago Dei to be as empirically unobservable as its divine source eliminates this 
problem. 
3.5. The Limits of Science and a Place for Theology. Pope John Paul II says in a 1996 
address that while the ultimate component of human nature, its spiritual aspect, came to 
be a part of humanity at a certain point over the course of Homo sapiens' biological 
evolution, science can tell us nothing about this aspect: 
"The sciences of observation describe and measure the multiple manifestations of 
life with increasing precision and correlate them with the time line. The moment 
of transition to the spiritual cannot be the object of this kind of observation, which 
nevertheless can discover at the experimental level a series of very valuable signs 
indicating what is specific to the human being. But the experience of 
metaphysical knowledge, of self-awareness and self-reflection, of moral 
conscience, freedom, or again of aesthetic and religious experience, falls within 
the competence of philosophical analysis and reflection, while theology brings out 
its ultimate meaning according to the Creator's plans."208 
Consequently, objects of theological knowledge, such as the soul, are judged to be 
scientifically unstudiable, non empirical realities. In the above passage, John Paul II 
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reassures his audience that the theological understanding of human nature is in no danger 
of being dismantled by any scientific discovery. 
As God is Himself invisible and non empirical, then it seems reasonable to assert 
that the breath of God dwelling within the bodies of Homines sapientes is also invisible, 
and cannot be an object of study by any scientific discipline. Whatever one understands 
to be evidence of the breath of God, whether intellectual understanding or the ability to 
pray, both are really merely the fruits of divine life, external signs of its existence, and 
not that divine breath itself. 
If it is the case that both scientific and theological kinds of knowledge are equally 
cultural and rational ways of interpreting the world, as van Huyssteen suggests,209 then 
our understanding of the created world, divinity, and the overlap between the two we now 
understand as human nature must allow for both points of view to have something 
unique, yet valid to say about the world. If we accept the Christian understanding of the 
human being to be an animal given a unique kind of divine life, then it becomes clear 
which understanding of human nature and embodied divine life is the most acceptable. 
Even though Ruse makes every attempt to avoid the inevitable answer, preferring to 
remain a naturalist, only the Platonic-Augustinian acceptance of a combined physical and 
spiritual nature for humanity seems more compatible with Christian anthropology. The 
Platonic-Augustinian understanding that the soul is an entirely different substance from 
the body seems also to be more in harmony with the theological understanding of God as 
a communicating person. Understanding the soul as a specially and intentionally given 
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gift makes it easier for us to understand God as a loving and generous Father than does 
understanding it to be an evolving pattern structuring biological material. 
Ultimately, we have seen Ruse's attempt to reconcile a Thomistic understanding 
of human nature with a naturalistic Darwinian understanding of biological life meet its 
end in the face of difficulties which do not seem to be solvable. In light of these 
difficulties, it can be recognized how contrary Ruse's attempt is to the van Huyssteenian 
multidisciplinary approach to investigating and understanding any knowable 
phenomenon. While van Huyssteen sees no harm in allowing non-empirical realities to 
play a role in his explanations, Ruse seeks to avoid them whenever possible, and as a 
result is unsatisfied by any Platonic explanation that, while being easier to reconcile with 
Christianity, ultimately amounts to a dualistic account of human nature. However, the 
naturalistic account Ruse prefers leaves unanswered the problem of explaining the unique 
human nature Christianity believes separates human beings and other animals. 
If one wishes to embrace a Christian anthropology while still accepting the fact of 
biological evolution, the most satisfaction seems only be found in an Augustinian 
understanding, even if it is not reductionist. Only with this view can we preserve the 
theological fact that God implanted a spiritual nature into an animal taken from "the dust 
of the earth", physical matter, in order to create a unique kind of being capable of living 
in His image. Van Huyssteen accepts from the very beginning that attempting to 
understand anything through the limits of a single discipline, whether limited to the 
empirical or non-empirical, will result in only limited knowledge. Overcoming his 
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discomfort and accepting an approach more similar to van Huyssteen's would allow Ruse 
to easily leap over the impasses blocking his way. 
3.6. Conclusion. Ruse has been an important thinker for us to consider in this chapter, 
because he makes an explicit attempt to integrate into one single account both scientific 
and theological understandings of the origin of Homo sapiens. Ruse is especially 
interesting for us and this investigation, in that he attempts to make use of both science 
and theology in his explanation, rather than draw a line between separate domains of 
knowledge, as did Ratzinger. In this way, Ruse and van Huyssteen share the same goal, 
as both hope to reach a more complete understanding of human nature through the 
integration of both disciplines. Unfortunately, the viewpoints of Ruse and van Huyssteen 
part ways on the issue of reductionism; while van Huyssteen has no problem accepting 
multiple ways of understanding a phenomenon which are not ultimately reducible to one 
another, Ruse refuses to rest until he has found a single explanation that supports both 
viewpoints. In other words, while van Huyssteen respects the boundaries between 
disciplines, while nevertheless looking beyond them in order to gain further knowledge, 
Ruse seeks to eliminate all possible boundaries. Because of this, Ruse feels that the best 
way to incorporate theology and science when explaining human nature and origins is 
through an Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the soul. Unfortunately, this leads to 
making significant compromises with theological understandings of human nature. 
The purpose of this chapter was to determine how Homo sapiens could be 
understood to exist in imago Dei in light of the fact of evolution and the overlapping 
cognitive capacities of some Homines sapientes and animals outside the species Homo 
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sapiens. My conclusion is that human nature belongs not to the species Homo sapiens, 
but to a particular family of Homo sapiens which nevertheless now includes every 
Homines sapientes alive today. Accepting this possibility in conjunction with a 
theological understanding that God extended His own divine nature into physical matter 
in order to create human beings leads to the understanding that God placed a human 
nature into an already existing species. Thus God employed the use of both physical and 
spiritual actions in order to bring human creatures into being. 
While the strictly scientific description of the Mitochondrial Eve is fascinating all 
on its own, understanding the theological fact that the Family Homo sapiens now lives 
with the divine life of God inside it greatly enhances our understanding of human nature. 
At the same time, scientific discoveries can help us to better understand the reality being 
described by the author of Genesis, using empirical facts and a specific point in history to 
reveal how a spiritual truth manifested itself in a physical reality. If science is able to 
show us how to understand what theology tells us about the origins of human nature, 
especially through an interpretation that sees the story of Adam and Eve as less 
metaphorical than it is often assumed to be,210 then the value of employing a 
multidisciplinary approach to human nature, such as that advocated by van Huyssteen, 
becomes more obvious. 
The next chapter shall consider the implications which follow from this van 
Huyssteenian approach. If Rusian naturalism fails to offer a satisfying understanding of 
human nature and human origins, then we can accept a multidisciplinary understanding 
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as the best means of gaining the most comprehensive understanding of human nature. 
The implications to be considered include accepting the presence of a spiritual substance 
alongside a physical one in the human being (dualism), as well as the question of how to 
classify other intelligent creatures if they are not human beings. Also addressed will be 
the question of whether intelligence is best understood as an aspect of divine life or of 
animal nature. 
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Chapter Four: Understanding the Human Soul. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the spiritual nature of human uniqueness. 
This shall be done by first elaborating the idea first put forth in the previous chapter that 
humanity's spiritual uniqueness is not the same as its intellectual uniqueness. Rather than 
understand intelligence as divine, as thinkers such as Plato and Aquinas once imagined, 
more contemporary thinkers such as van Huyssteen and Lonergan have instead suggested 
that loving relationships are a sign of Godly nature. The purpose of this chapter shall be 
to consider whether the understanding that the Aristotelian intellectual soul is really more 
an aspect of animal nature or of human nature. Also, it shall address the coexistence of 
both physical and spiritual substances in the human being, in light of the previous 
chapter's acceptance of a more Platonic understanding of the human soul. Therefore, the 
idea of dualism shall be addressed, as it is determined how closely Plato's understanding 
conforms to our present understanding. 
4.1. The Status of the Intellectual Soul. This section shall examine the place of the 
Aristotelian idea of the intellectual soul, in light of the conclusion of the previous chapter. 
As the last two chapters discussed the idea that intelligence is not what allows a creature 
to exist in God's image, it must now be determined how intelligence relates to human 
nature. This shall be done in the following pages. 
While discussing animal intelligence in The Dragons of Eden. Carl Sagan 
recounts an old story told by Plutarch and Pliny: 
"A dog, following the scent of its master, was observed to come to a triple fork in 
the road. It ran down the leftmost prong, sniffing; then stopped and returned to 
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follow the middle prong for a short distance, again sniffing and then turning back. 
Finally, with no sniffing at all, it raced joyously down the right-hand prong of the 
forked road."211 
While Sagan tells us that Michel de Montaigne argued that the story demonstrates a clear 
example of what he called "canine syllogistic reasoning", Sagan tells us that Aquinas 
had a different interpretation: 
"St. Thomas Aquinas attempted unsuccessfully to deal with the story. He cited it 
as a cautionary example of how the appearance of intelligence can exist where no 
intelligence is in fact present. Aquinas did not, however, offer a satisfactory 
alternative explanation of the dog's behavior." 
For many thinkers and for many centuries, it was intelligence that was believed to serve 
as the mark of human uniqueness. Though they understood it to exist in different ways, it 
has been noted already how it was the belief of Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. 
Thomas Aquinas that an intellectual soul was what set human beings apart from other 
kinds of animals. This understanding continued to prevail for many more centuries, as 
thinkers such as Rene Descartes came to believe that a thinking substance served as the 
most undeniable aspect of human life. 2 Even Carl Sagan, who observes human nature 
from an entirely scientific point of view, is forced to concede that intelligence alone is the 
source of human uniqueness.215 Also, through his attempt to describe the reconciliation 
of Catholic theology with Darwinism, Michael Ruse is forced to accept a Thomistic 
understanding of the human soul that describes a structure allowing for intelligent 
behavior. 
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Problematically for Aquinas, and other theistic thinkers who identified the human 
soul with the intellect, examples demonstrating intelligence to exist in other animal 
species are numerous. They are also utterly reasonable, if we consider the close relation 
these other species share with Homo sapiens. As Maclntyre notes, attributing 
recognition, intentionality and communication to dolphins helps to satisfactorily explain 
their actions and behavior.216 This understanding becomes especially reasonable if one 
considers the size of the dolphin brain in proportion to the body, as well as the 
complexity of the dolphin bram. 
As noted in the previous chapter, Michael Ruse poses an interesting question as 
he considers what it would mean for human life to emerge from non-human life. His 
words shall be more fully stated here, so that his idea might be reconsidered in light of 
our current discussion: 
"Of course, theologically you can insist that some pair [of ancestral Homines 
sapientes] did uniquely get immortal souls (miraculously), and there is an end to 
it. By fiat you can introduce all the intelligence you like into these souls. All else 
is contingent irrelevance. There were members of Homo sapiens before this pair 
and around this pair, but these others were not humans in the theological sense: 
that is, beings with immortal souls. But this stipulation is not without its 
difficulties, tensions certainly. Darwinian biology suggests that intelligence (and, 
as we shall see, related freedom and moral awareness) would be possessed by the 
parent generation and the contemporary generation and those of the next 
generations not descended from the pair. So on what basis can we declare them 
not to have been made in God's image?"218 
Ruse is asking what ultimately prevents us from understanding all intelligent forms of life 
to be human, especially within the species Homo sapiens. While both the theist Stephen 
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R. L. Clark and the atheist Carl Sagan would each answer, "nothing!" and proceed to 
extend the boundaries of humanity to any other sufficiently intelligent creature, this is not 
so easily done for thinkers who do not wish to compromise their theological 
understanding of human nature. 
This issue is addressed in a speculative essay by Dominican Thomas F. O'Meara. 
O'Meara considers the possible existence of intelligent extraterrestrial life in order to 
imagine the impact its discovery might have on Christian understandings of redemption. 
At one point in the essay, he considers the existence of beings who are intelligent but 
have no understanding of religious concepts nor any relationship with God: 
"Are beings on untold planets called to a special relationship with God, to a share 
in divine life beyond intelligence? The ways in which supernatural life touches 
sensate intellect and will, the modes of contact in revelation may be quite diverse, 
and it is a mistake to think that our understanding of 'covenant', the 'reign of 
God', 'redemption', or 'shared life' exhausts the modes by which divine power 
shares something of its infinite life. On the other hand, do another planet's 
intelligences find in their world natural life and no more? They may have in their 
psychological and biological energies no aspiration to life after death, no longing 
for fulfillment from beyond, and no special contact from God."219 
Though O'Meara does not specifically say so, the imaginary beings he describes would 
not be considered human according to the understanding I have described over the course 
of this thesis, for they fail to both reach out from this world to connect with the 
supernatural, and to manifest the life of God in this world. If these creatures lack the 
spiritual aspect the Family Homo sapiens possesses, which allows for a religous life and 
makes an awareness of God possible, then we would be ultimately forced to conclude 
that such creatures are fully animal. This is because in spite of their intelligence, at no 
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point in their evolutionary history was the living breath of God placed into any ancestral 
members of their kind. 
Let us for the moment accept Ruse's observation (and criticism) that the first 
members of the species Homo sapiens we might call "theologically human" were very 
similar, if not nearly identical to both their own parents as well as other contemporary 
members of the species. Let us for the moment recognize that they resemble these other 
individuals very closely in both intelligence and moral awareness, as Ruse suggests. If 
we do, then we must wonder how we are to describe the first true humans as unique. To 
help us answer, van Huyssteen offers the suggestion that the historical "Adam and Eve" 
"were the first hominid group that in whatever form of religion or language used 
some form of expression that we might translate as 'God'. On this view Adam and 
Eve strikingly represent the first hominid group that by ritual action were 
embodied before God, and thus Christian theology is liberated from the obligation 
to anxiously stipulate morphological marks that distinguish prehumans from 
humans in the evolutionary succession." 
If we then understand that a supernatural, purely spiritual aspect is responsible for the 
Family Homo sapiens'1 existence in imago Dei, then we have explained the ontological 
difference that sets Homo sapiens apart from other hominid species. If we understand 
that the breath of God, a unique kind of spiritual substance, was placed into the distant 
but direct ancestors of all presently-surviving Homines sapientes, then we may 
understand it to serve as the source of the Family's unique, religious behavior. 
If we understand God to be a non-empirical reality, then we may also come to 
accept the breath of God placed into the species Homo sapiens to be also non-empirical, 
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and purely an object of theological understanding. Understanding the breath of God as a 
spiritual substance placed into the physical body of the human being allows us to accept 
an understanding of the human soul closer to the Platonic-Augustinian conception 
described by Ruse. It allows us to understand that humanity exists wherever this 
substance exists, even if that substance provides no external signs signaling its presence. 
As a result, young, autistic or handicapped Homines sapientes could be described as 
human through the presence of the breath of God in their bodies, even if they fail to 
behave as other human beings do. 
Biologically speaking, then, the differences marking the species Homo sapiens 
from other forms of animal life would prove to be only of degree, and not kind. The 
same would be true of the intelligence Homo sapiens possesses, if intelligence exists in 
other species of animal life. Anthropologically, however, the ability of most members of 
the Family Homo sapiens to exhibit religious behavior might be understood to set that 
population apart, if it serves as a sort of "sign post" testifying to the presence of a human 
soul in them. If we accept this, we must not make the mistake of considering this to be 
an infallible sign. This is because not all members of the species are capable of behaving 
in religious ways or understanding religious ideas. Nevertheless, the pervasive and 
undeniably significant presence of religion in the cultural life of Homo sapiens may offer 
the theistic investigator of human nature a strong reason to believe the Family Homo 
sapiens is theologically unique. The breath of God, though not an empirical substance, 
may be understood to manifest itself in the cultural lives of the creatures it resides within. 
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Understanding that the members of the Family Homo sapiens are human beings 
because they possess a divine substance in their bodies allows us to defend the humanity 
of any form of life descended from the original possessors of this substance. As a result, 
we can recognize the source of true humanity to be more than a mere creation of God, but 
the very life of God Himself 
4.2. A Return to Dualism. It is my hope that the arguments and speculations of the 
previous chapter and section were able to provide a convincing response to the question 
of why, in light of a theological awareness of the divine life in an embodied creature, 
human nature must be denied to all organisms not descended from the first bearers of this 
ontological distinction. At the same time, it is my hope that these arguments have offered 
a reasonable explanation of why a distinctly human nature might still be understood to 
exist within all Homines sapientes currently inhabiting the planet earth, regardless of 
their intelligence or maturity. The following section shall recognize that understanding a 
spiritual substance to coexist with a physical body results in a dualistic understanding of 
human nature. The purpose of this section shall be to determine the exact nature of this 
dualism, in order to set it apart from traditional understandings of mind-body dualism 
such as the one described by Descartes. 
If it is the case that the human being is determined by the presence of an 
unobservable spiritual aspect dwelling within a physical, biological body, then we seem 
to have returned to the largely abandoned notion of a dualistic human nature in which 
material and spiritual aspects jointly compose a single reality. Yet this nevertheless is not 
the dualism of mind and body held by Plato or Descartes, for the intellect (or mind) is in 
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this view not understood to be separate from the body. More than this, intellect (or mind) 
is not to be understood to be an exclusive attribute of the species Homo sapiens, if 
intelligent behavior is to be observed in other animals such as orang-utans and dolphins. 
Otherwise, one must hold to the notion that any conscious creature is in possession of a 
divine substance existing entirely apart from the body (a notion which, however, both 
Clark and Plato would appear to accept). 
On the other hand, anyone claiming that an intelligent, human nature might only 
be found in the species Homo sapiens would be forced to deny that intelligence exists in 
any species that is not Homo sapiens. This would have to be done even when confronted 
with possible evidence that intelligence in fact exists in other animal species, as has been 
done by Aquinas, Descartes, and Malebranche. 
Thus the Aristotelian understanding that an animal's mind arises from the unity of 
an intellectual soul and a material body, allows us to understand that an animal's mind is 
ultimately inseparable from its body.222 As a result, it is not the "non-bodily half of the 
dualism I am describing. To elaborate from Michael Ruse, 
"For Aristotle/Aquinas, the human soul - identified with the intellectual faculty, 
which makes a human being a living human being - is not a thing, in the sense of 
a material substance. It is rather much more a principle of ordering or what, in 
221
 Kortlandt, Adriaan. "Spirits Dressed in Furs?." The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity, 
eds. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 138. 
222 
Further details about the identification of the mind with the soul, as well as the question of whether the 
mind can exist independently of the brain, can be found in the following sources: 
Watson, Richard A., "Ghost in the Machine Fights the Last Battle for the Human Soul". Kriterion: Revista-
de-Filosofia, 37.94 (1996): 55-63.; 
Flanagan, Owen, The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them. (Reading: 
Perseus Books, 2002). 
102 
Aristotelian terms, is called the 'form'. It is something real and can act as a kind 
of cause - Aquinas speaks of 'actuating', but it is not a substance. 'Any particular 
body that is alive, or even indeed a source of life, is so from being a body of such-
and-such a kind. Now whatever is actually such, as distinct from not-such, has 
this from some principle which we call its actuating principle. Therefore a soul, 
as the primary principle of life, is not a body but that which actuates a body' ."223 
Ruse, we see, understands the Aristotelian intellectual form to be a sort of "information 
bearing pattern" that determines the living body which it actualizes. This view, he 
acknowledges, may be understood to be reconcilable with a naturalistic, Darwinian 
understanding of an intelligent, animal nature: 
"I do not find this coincidence surprising. Aristotle was not just a philosopher, 
but a biologist - and a good one. He was also someone whose philosophy was 
'naturalistic' in the sense that he tried to base his philosophy on the empirical facts 
as he saw them. His notion of soul was not intended to be airy-fairy or ethereal, 
but something which makes sense of things as we find them. This is the 
Darwinian position also." 
So it might be possible to embrace, even from a purely scientific perspective, the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the intellectual soul. This is possible because 
the intellectual soul is not understood to be supernatural or divine; rather, it evolved 
naturally as an aspect of biological life. If we do accept this idea, however, we must also 
recognize that it is not the intellectual soul that makes an animal a human being. If we 
understand that science can never grasp the unique spiritual substance present in the 
Family Homo sapiens, then we may acknowledge that there is more to human nature than 
the possession of a body capable of both thought and the ability to gain knowledge. This 
is especially obvious if we understand that the reality which human animals exist in the 
image of, God, is not primarily understood to be intelligent, but loving. 
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4.3. Love. This section shall reflect on the loving natures of God and humanity. It shall 
be recognized that if God is loving and human beings were created to imitate God, then 
human beings were created to love as God loves. More than this, if God is to be 
identified as Love, as Christian theology teaches, and if the living breath of God dwells 
within human beings on earth, then it follows that human beings are actually composed 
oftheloveof God. 
As Bernard Lonergan notes, the Family Homo sapiens was aware of the love of God 
long before any of its individual members reflected on the existence of an Unmoved 
Mover, or any other purely intellectual conception of God: 
"The vast majority of mankind have been religious. One cannot claim that their 
religion has been based on some philosophy of God. One can easily argue that 
their religious concern arose out of their religious experience. In that case the 
basic question of God is the fourth question that arises out of religious experience. 
It is only in the climate of a philosophically differentiated culture that there occurs 
reflection on our questions for intelligence, our questions for reflection, and our 
11^ 
questions for deliberation." 
Thus God was always encountered first in terms of loving relationships, not in an 
awareness of a mind.226 It was this divine Lover humanity sought to relate to through the 
rituals and religions it developed. If this is Who God is, then human beings most 
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especially live in imitation of God when they act out of love for one another.227 Thus this 
is the image of God, for God loves. 
In the earliest centuries of Christianity, St. John the Evangelist not only described 
God as Love, but went on to describe the loving relationship shared between Jesus Christ 
and God the Father. He did this by stating in his gospel that Christ manifests His love for 
the Father through His obedience to Him, while the Father reveals His love for the world 
through the life and death of Christ.228 Christ's command for His followers,"love one 
another as I have loved you" offers all human beings an opportunity to emulate God in 
their earthly lives.229 Returning to more recent times and more contemporary thinkers, 
we see the same understanding of God being described and the same ideas being 
expressed through writers such as Bernard Lonergan and Joseph Ratzinger. After 
becoming Pope Benedict XVI, Ratzinger noted that St. John was the only New 
Testament writer to define God, Whom he describes on three separate occasions as 
"spirit", "light", and "love":230 
"By so doing, John wants to say that the essential constituent of God is love and 
hence, that all God's activity is born from love and impressed with love: all that 
God does, he does out of love and with love, even if we are not always 
immediately able to understand that this is love, true love. At this point, however, 
it is indispensable to take another step and explain that God has concretely 
demonstrated his love by entering human history through the Person of Jesus 
Christ, incarnate, dead and risen for us. [...] Those words of Jesus, 'as I have 
loved you', simultaneously invite and disturb us; they are a Christological goal 
that can appear unattainable, but at the same time they are an incentive that does 
not allow us to ensconce ourselves in what we have been able to achieve. It does 
Ibid., 58. 227 
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not permit us to be content with what we are but spurs us to keep advancing 
towards this goal. "231 
The New Testament understanding of God as both a Lover and as Love itself (Himself), 
one reiterated by Christian theologians up until the present day, not only offers us an 
understanding of Who God is and what God does, but also tells us how human beings are 
to act if they are to live in imitation of God. 
And so we can understand, through considering science and theology together, 
that though the body is a product of evolution, the spiritual aspect of human animals is 
not. Rather, it is a gift from God, originating from beyond this world. As the receivers of 
this gift, human beings bear an ontological distinction from other animal species, for they 
are not wholly products of evolution. The supernatural substance that makes the Family 
Homo sapiens human is itself invisible, though it reveals its presence within the species 
through familial love and religious relationships, as Lonergan stated. Through such 
actions, the divine reality of God breaks into the material world, and finds life there. 
Human beings, then, might be understood to be embodiments of Love in the world. Their 
communities are extensions of this love, both reflecting the divine community of the 
Trinity and ensuring the survival of the bodies holding that love. 
At this point, we must recognize that the understandings of what it means to live 
in imago Dei offered by van Huyssteen, Ratzinger, and Maclntyre converge, together 
with Lonergan's understanding of a loving and relational God. A brief quotation from 
each shall demonstrate their shared understandings of human nature. 
1
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Maclntyre: "[I]n order to flourish, we need both those virtues that enable us to 
function as independent and accountable practical reasoners and those virtues that 
enable us to acknowledge the nature and extent of our dependence on others."232 
Ratzinger: "Human beings are relational, and they possess their lives -
themselves - only by way of relationship. I alone am not myself, but only in and 
with you am I myself. To be truly a human being means to be related in love, to 
be o/and/or."233 
Van Huyssteen: "The idea [of imago Dei] is also seen in the broader context of 
the imitation of God, the imitatio Dei. Here the knowledge that we are created in 
God's image brings with it the obligation to show oneself worthy of God's love 
by acting in accordance with that love."234 
Lonergan: "If persons are the products of community, if the strongest and the 
best of communities is based on love, then religious experience and the 
emergence of personality go hand in hand."235 
As we consider each quotation, in light of the understandings of human nature and 
God each has brought to this discussion, we recognize that several different but 
complimentary perspectives are being offered. Maclntyre, who is not a theologian, does 
not invoke any divine commandments or note an existence in imago Dei for human 
beings, but only attempts to describe a successfully surviving community of individuals. 
Ratzinger calls human beings to embrace God's commandment and love one another, 
while acknowledging how much each human being is in need of love. Ratzinger notes 
that through loving our neighbors as ourselves, we transcend our limitations and become 
more actively like God. Van Huyssteen stresses the embodied nature of the human being 
as the means through which a life lived in imitation of God is possible. Lonergan, 
finally, offers a more theological account of what Maclntyre describes, singling out love 
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as the heart of the community, and acknowledging the love of God as the source of 
humankind's loving relationships. 
In each, the importance of living for others is stressed, for both practical and 
spiritual reasons. One of these is the survival of the community, which is assured if all 
abandon selfish behavior and work for the good and protection of one another. A second 
is the love of God, as loving others as God loves them invites the love of God to come 
more completely inot the world. A third is because a life lived loving others is natural for 
us, for human persons were created to imitate in their family relationships the love of the 
Divine Family, the Trinity. It was out of this eternal context of Love that the world 
emerged, and it is this love that human animals evolved to participate in. 
4.4. Conclusion. It has been shown that ultimately it is possible to understand both an 
Augustinian ontological dualism and a Thomistic intellectual soul simultaneously present 
in a human being. However, before we do this, we must divorce from our understanding 
of the Thomistic rational soul any belief that its possession allows for an existence in 
imago Dei. At the same time, we must not make the mistake of understanding the 
spiritual substance of the human being to be an intellectual soul, but instead as the very 
breath and life of God. By making these qualifications to both St. Augustine's and St. 
Thomas's ideas of the human soul, we have found an understanding that is free from the 
problems posed by explaining human nature through reductionistic Darwinian theory, 
recognizing the animal nature of Homo sapiens, and demonstrations of intelligent 
behavior in other animal species besides Homo sapiens. We have also found a 
description that reminds us that if God is Himself Love itself, as Christian theologians 
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such as Bernard Lonergan tells us, and if Homo sapiens carry within their bodies the life 
and love of God, then Homo sapiens carries the life of God into the world. More than 
this, through the loving relationships of its members, the species extends the love and life 
of God all across the world. 
The ideas of Maclntyre, Ratzinger, van Huyssteen, and Lonergan, considered in 
the preceding section describe the body as the means through which relations of love are 
carried out. The theologians of the group, meanwhile, go further in order to identify the 
love of God coming into the world through these relations. The dualistic understanding 
of the human being recognized in this chapter might then be understood to be a sort of 
atomic component in a greater embodiment of God, which is realized through the loving 
actions of its individual parts. Thus the bodies of the entire human species are capable of 
uniting into a single communion of love, which allows God to live more fully in the 
world. 
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Chapter Five - Conclusion and Reflections. 
5.1. Summary of the Past Four Chapters. The purpose of this thesis was to 
understand the essence of human nature, especially theistic conceptions, in light of the 
scientific facts of evolution and the animal nature of the beings most typically regarded as 
human. Examining a more comprehensive study of humanity allows us to better 
understand the grounds on which theists assert that Homo sapiens is a uniquely human 
species, even in spite of the fact that its members are descended from non-human 
creatures, and that its kindred species sharing many of the same evolutionary ancestors 
lack humanity. 
In the first chapter I discussed and demonstrated how in different disciplines of 
study and knowledge, humanity has different meanings and is determined by different 
facts. As a result of these differences, humanity has come to be both understood and 
determined in different ways by several different points of view. The overlapping nature 
of some of these understandings show us that at least some understandings of human 
nature can be related. These overlaps allow different perspectives of human nature to 
share some facts in common, even though each emphasizes different readings of those 
facts. Consider, for example, the ethical understanding of humanity developed by 
Maclntyre, together with the theological description provided by Ratzinger. While 
Ratzinger emphasizes the divine life inhabiting the biological body of an animal as the 
most important aspect of human nature, Maclntyre considers the dependant vulnerability 
of the biological body to be humanity's most definitive aspect. Nevertheless, for 
Ratzinger, the social existence of humanity is fundamental to either view, as it allows for 
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human life to emulate divine life. Meanwhile, however, Maclntyre sees community life 
as the means through which the successful survival of the human species is assured. 
Because different disciplines of study are capable of differently understanding the same 
realty, incorporating multiple understandings of human nature into one ultimate 
multidisciplinary understanding can offer the most complete understanding. This is the 
approach defended by van Huyssteen. 
However, this technique will only succeed if one is willing to consider disciplines 
such as science, ethics, and theology to be equally valid—yet incomplete-means of 
attaining different kinds of knowledge. If the considerer is open, then the understanding 
of human nature he or she gains when employing such a method can be defended as the 
most complete. This is because it is not limited by any of the restrictions that prevent 
subjects such as physical science from commenting on the ethical or religious truths 
found in ethics or theology. Only when one has a more complete understanding of 
human nature, as a result of a multidisciplinary investigation, can one attempt to defend 
the uniqueness of humanity in an evolving world and in light of Homo sapiens1 biological 
nature. 
I began the second chapter by considering scientific challenges of human 
uniqueness brought to light by the fact of evolution and the animal nature of human 
beings. I also discussed the close ancestral relation that forces us to acknowledge Homo 
sapiens as a kind of ape together with other apes which are typically not considered to be 
human. Because such essentially human characteristics as intelligence and language can 
be observed to be present in other animal species, we have been given an opportunity to 
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consider whether other animal species might be human too, just as Clark does. As a 
result, I discussed Clark's claim that Homo sapiens must share its status as imago Dei 
with countless other species of animal. Unfortunately, I noted, this is of course 
incompatible with the theological understanding that God implanted an aspect of His 
divine life into a single family of earthly creatures. If we accept the validity of 
theologically-based knowledge, then it appears that intellect and language are not after all 
signs of divinity, as Clark claims, but are simply aspects of evolved animal nature. 
I then considered van Huyssteen's claim that a capacity for religious rituals, 
religious experience, and the ability to have a relationship with God is not only unique to 
Homo sapiens, but also allows the species to live in imitation of God. This idea was 
supported by discussing Lonergan's theological understanding that God is most primarily 
revealed to us as a loving person. This capacity for religious behavior and an awareness 
of divinity might allow us to recognize the uniqueness that makes Homo sapiens a human 
species. 
In the third chapter, I noted that all Homines sapientes share a single common 
ancestor, and are as a result all the members of a single family. Recognizing this is 
important, for it allows us to understand that Homo sapiens possesses a biological 
distinction that sets it scientifically apart from all other related species of primate. I also 
discussed the theological claim that Homo sapiens alone possesses a divine spiritual 
substance as a part of its being. I discussed how the possession of this substance sets it 
apart from all other forms of animal life, including the species' closest relatives. Through 
noting the extremely close relationship all Homines sapientes genetically share, I stated 
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that it is reasonable to accept mentally handicapped and disabled Homines sapientes as 
human. However, attempting to prove the handicapped and others to be fully human 
through the use of biology alone does not lead to a satisfying empirical proof of their 
humanity, family relations aside. Recognizing the limits of science in this matter, the 
third chapter acknowledges the turn that must be made to theological understandings of 
human nature, which are capable of asserting a non-empirical aspect that defines human 
nature. 
In the fourth chapter I acknowledged the dualism one must commit to if one 
accepts theological notions of human nature to be valid. I confirmed the understanding 
that such attributes as intelligence and language are indeed simply aspects of animal 
nature. This prompts a new understanding of human dualism not as a unity of a mind and 
a body, but instead as the unity of a spiritual substance with a biological one. In light of 
this fact, an attempt was made to consider the nature of other forms of intelligent life, if 
they lack the invisible theological element that makes biological animal life human in the 
Family Homo sapiens. 
Ultimately, I conclude, it is this dualistic union of divine and animal life which 
together comprise the human being. The spiritual substance residing in the animal body 
of the species Homo sapiens is what makes it a human species, and sets it apart from all 
other forms of life in the world. Recognizing this allows us to continue to assert the 
animal nature of Homo sapiens, together with the understanding that the species arose 
through a process of biological evolution. This allows us to recognize that attributes such 
as intelligence or language use are not restricted to Homo sapiens alone, and may have 
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evolved to exist in other species, even if to lesser degrees. Also, understanding that a 
spiritual substance (which theology describes as the breath of God) came to reside in the 
ancestors of Homo sapiens, allows us to recognize an ontological distinction that makes 
the species unlike any other. Understanding the breath of God to be the very life of God 
allows us to recognize that through the Family Homo sapiens, God has overcome the 
restrictions of physical existence in order to enter into the world, Himself. Using both 
science and theology together to understand human nature allows us to assert both Homo 
sapiens' animal and divine existences simultaneously. 
I shall end this summary with a brief recapitulation of the ideas offered by the 
thinkers considered in this thesis, together with the purpose each thinker's ideas served. 
Near the end of Chapter Four, I noted the relationship of the understandings of human 
nature described by Maclntyre, Ratzinger, van Huyssteen, and Lonergan. Simply put, 
each recognizes the necessity of the community for the survival of human life. However, 
the theologians of the group go beyond practical, this-worldly motivations such as 
survival, in order to offer God as the reason why human beings live in loving 
relationships. Yet while Ratzinger and van Huyssteen cite Jesus's commandment to love 
one another as humanity's reason to live in the image of God, Lonergan goes beyond it, 
citing the loving relationship within God Himself as the source of humanity's identity, 
and the reason why human beings live in loving communities. Simply, human beings 
were never intended to do anything else, or live in any other way. Accepting and 
employing van Huyssteen's multidisciplinary method of investigation allowed us to 
incorporate each of these perspectives of human nature into a single, more 
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comprehensive perspective, which allowed us to embrace a more complete understanding 
of human nature. 
Sagan's understanding also served to underlie the multidisciplinary view 
advocated by van Huyssteen, who was open to scientific understandings of human 
uniqueness as well as theological understandings, by explaining human life in purely 
biological terms. At the same time, both Maclntyre's ethical and and van Huyssteen's 
multidisciplinary understandings embrace the physical, embodied understanding which 
Sagan describes. This is because the fragility and vulnerability resulting from a 
biological existence serve as the reason why caring communities are the best way to 
ensure the survival of the species. This supports van Huyssteen's observation that to 
exist in imago Dei is to exist in imitatio Dei. 
The thought of Clark, on the other hand, was included largely to demonstrate the 
folly of attempting to use a biological understanding of Homo sapiens to demonstrate 
human uniqueness. This is because the aspect that sets human beings apart from other 
forms of animal life is not an object of scientific investigation. As a result, neither 
biology nor attributes such as intelligence or language use can be shown to make Homo 
sapiens a unique species. This is because such attributes are not unique to other animal 
species, as was demonstrated by both Maclntyre and Miles. 
Ruse's purpose was similar to Clark's; while attempting to pull down the barriers 
between such disciplines as science and theology, contrary to van Huyssteen's 
multidisciplinary method of investigation, he demonstrated that a purely naturalistic, 
scientific understanding could never show Homo sapiens to be a unique species on its 
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own. By attempting to explain Homo sapiens" theologically understood uniqueness 
through Darwinian reductionism, Ruse was forced to compromise his theological 
understanding. As a result, Ruse demonstrates the value of accepting a multidisciplinary 
understanding of human nature: it allows us to understand the Family Homo sapiens to be 
truly unique and a product of divine creation, while at the same time accepting and 
embracing the species' evolving, biological nature. 
5.2. Reflection. The first chapter of this thesis quoted a remark from Ratzinger that 
forces us to confront the ultimate nature of humanity, and what being human really 
means: 
"Indeed, to the question as to what distinguishes the human being from an animal, 
as to what is specifically different about human beings, the answer has to be that 
they are the beings that God made capable of thinking and praying. They are 
most profoundly themselves when they discover their relation to their Creator."236 
It is the understanding of Ratzinger, then, that Homo sapiens is a unique species because 
it was made by God to exist in a relationship with Him, and is aware of His existence in a 
way like no other animal species. 
Maclntyre emphasizes the necessity of communal relations within the human 
family as humanity's ethically most fundamental aspect, while Ratzinger, Lonergan, and 
van Huyssteen theologically orient this aspect as the means through which humankind 
lives in imitation of God. One idea we might take from these connected observations is 
that to be human, one must be like God. Likeness to God is the basis of human nature, 
Ratzinger, Joseph. In the Beginning: A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall, 
trans. Boniface Ramsey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns. 1995) 48. 
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both Ratzinger and van Huyssteen tell us, and it is through their loving relationships that 
human beings take part in God's loving nature. 
Theology also tells us that our resemblance to God is rooted in a supernatural 
aspect placed in an animal organism by an historical act of God. As a result of this 
theological fact, we cannot accept either Ruse's version of traducianism, which describes 
the human soul evolving from a more primitive human soul, or any sort of notion that 
human uniqueness can be completely explained away as a result of evolution. 
Theological understandings, therefore, must not be compromised or determined by 
scientific understandings, or else they will cease to be purely theological understandings. 
Put simply, we might understand that while animals do not evolve into God, God placed 
His own spirit into animal life. Thus, theology and biology are both necessary if we are 
to fully understand earthly human nature. 
The divine part of the universe that is human existence did not naturally arise out 
of the evolution of intelligent animal life, but rather appeared supernaturally through an 
act of God upon the world. If we accept this theological fact, we must reject Clark's 
understanding that the whole universe has begun to reach a divine sort of existence 
through a natural process of evolution. If we reject Clark's understanding, then we have 
no choice but to recognize the divinity that exists at the heart of humanity. But if we 
recognize that human life exists in imitatio Dei, we may retain at least one important 
observation made by Clark: the idea that the earthly divine life found in the human family 
is derivative of a greater divine life, and that the greater divine life of God is divinity in a 
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more perfect (and in the most perfect) form. Human life is not of the earth and thus is 
nowhere to be found if we attempt to find it using science alone. 
It follows from this (as Clark notes) that human life is divine life. The two are 
identical; they are one and the same. It is not the possession of intelligence that makes 
Homo sapiens divine, as Clark believes, but the species' unique capacity for loving, 
religious relationships, as Lonergan describes. The human community as it exists on 
earth is a reflection of the communion of God both within Himself (in the persons of the 
Trinity) and His Creation, for the relations which exist within each are the same. If God 
is a greater state of divine existence than that which is found in the animal life on earth, 
then God also exists in a greater state of humanity. 
God is, therefore, the most human person in existence. God is also the original 
human being, and was human before the species Homo sapiens ever evolved. The mortal 
humanity of the Family Homo sapiens, then, is derivative of the eternal humanity of God. 
In light of this realization some of us might see Homo sapiens to be a species of 
crippled divinity, alive through their each being a part of the greater divine spirit, yet 
separated from the whole of it. While God is complete in His communion within the 
persons of the Trinity, individual human beings are incomplete and singular in their 
separation from their source. This idea comes primarily from Maclntyre, and his 
understanding that humanity's animal nature makes human life on earth both vulnerable 
and in need of caring relationships. Yet through Maclntyre's understanding of human 
nature, we could understand animal vulnerability to be the crutch that allows a limited 
divinity to become complete in the context of a loving community. 
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The body, as a result, becomes essential to earthly humanity for an entirely 
different reason than Aristotle and Aquinas understood. As the spiritual nature of God, 
which is divine and human, exists without a physical body, then the body cannot be 
understood as a necessary means for spiritual existence, as Aristotle and Aquinas both 
asserted. Instead, the body serves with all its limitations as a means for the separated 
human spirit to become whole again. As loving relationships within the earthly family 
and community tie earthly human lives together and ensure both the survival and 
happiness of all, as Maclntyre describes, the relational nature of God reveals itself on 
earth as the spirit of God is reunited. 
5.3. Implications of this Reflection: A Better Understanding of "Humanity". This 
new understanding of humanity forces us to revise some of our uses of the word "human" 
in ordinary language, for they may sometimes be misleading. Too many times the word 
"human" has been used to describe not the divine and otherworldly aspect of the 
biological creatures existing in imago Dei, but really the worldly, animal nature such 
organisms possess. In order to illustrate, I shall present the following quotation: 
"The dual substance of Christ—the yearning, so human, so superhuman, of man 
to attain God ... has always been a deep inscrutable mystery to me. My principle 
anguish and source of all my joys and sorrows from my youth onward has been 
this incessant, merciless battle between the spirit and the flesh .. and my soul is 
the arena where these two armies have clashed and met."237 
While author Nikos Kazantzakis's novel, The Last Temptation, was written with the 
intention of presenting Jesus' struggle against the temptations and desires of His earthly 
body, in spite of His divine nature, it has been described as a chronicle of the struggle 
Kazantzakis, Nikos. The Last Temptation. (1951; New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960) 1. 
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between His humanity and divinity.238 Of course, if humanity and divinity are in fact one 
and the same thing, such a struggle would seem impossible. Kazantzakis' book, then, 
could be more accurately described as a presentation of Jesus' struggle between His 
divine and animal (that is, His human and animal) natures. The Jesus presented in the 
novel, as well as the Jesus believed in by Christians throughout history, was still 
understood to be, "at once complete in his divinity and complete in his humanity, true 
God and true man",239 as described by the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451. 
This clearer understanding of what the term "human" means forces us to acknowledge 
that Jesus's weaknesses lay not in His human, but instead in His animal, nature. 
In the same way, the consoling phrase "you're only human", used to reassure 
individuals facing weakness or limitations, is misleading. To say, "you're only an 
animal" offers a more accurate description of the reason why Homines sapientes are 
unable to live in states of perfect divinity and humanity. Of course, contemporary 
cultural understandings of the both animal nature and the nature of Homo sapiens would 
result in this more accurate phrase coming across as cruel and demeaning, if spoken. 
Only the adoption of an attitude that recognized the similar nature of other animal species 
and an honest recognition of Homo sapiens' own biological nature would remove the 
sting of such a remark. 
I shall conclude this section with a quotation that almost perfectly sums up my 
understanding of divine life and of loving human relationships as one and the same. The 
words have been taken from a sermon preached by the Salvadorian Jesuit Rutilio Grande, 
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who was later murdered for his efforts to liberate the peasants enslaved by the wealthy 
landowners of El Salvador. 
"The code of the Kingdom of God is love, and the key word which sums up all 
the ethical codes of humanity: love, without boundary lines, exalted and offered in 
Jesus. It is the love of brothers, which breaks down every sort of barrier and 
boundary and which must overcome hatred itself. We do not hate anyone; we 
love even these Cains [the landowners]. The Christian has no enemies, even these 
Cains. Even they are our brothers. But their contradiction of love creates moral 
violence which violates us and violates society. And yet the very violence they 
create unites us and brings us together even though they beat us down, because 
we bring love against their anti-love, against sin, injustice, the enslavement of 
mankind and the destruction of our brotherhood by our brother Cains." 
In the terms I have been using over the course of this thesis, I would say that Rutilio 
Grande understood greed and violence to be products of Homo sapiens'' animal nature, 
the results of biological limitation. Only the love of God, found in Homo sapiens^ human 
nature, is capable of overcoming the species' animal weakness. Through the 
communities he helped establish among the peasants of El Salvador, Grande brought God 
to the poor in a way the missionaries who had first brought them Christianity never 
had.241 
5.4. Implications of this Reflection: The Vulnerability of God. Our examination of 
all the various topics covered over the course of the preceding four chapters have firmly 
impressed upon us the fact of human vulnerability. We have come to recognize the 
helplessness of the individual members of the Family Homo sapiens, while understanding 
also that the life of God nevertheless dwells within those members. We have come to 
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understand this even in spite of the species' animal weaknesses and limitations. We can 
see how communal relations and acts of love within a family allow not only for an 
overcoming of such mortal limitations, but also how they allow the life of God to enter 
into the world and survive there. Recognizing this last fact forces us to confront another 
remarkable truth: the vulnerability of God Himself. God has placed Himself at the mercy 
of both Homo sapiens and the very world which He created. As a result of this, the 
Family Homo sapiens has been granted an opportunity to protect and care for its own 
Creator. 
Though it seems impossible, the existence of God's life within a species of animal 
means that the life of God can live in the world only if those capable of doing so take 
Him under their care and protect Him. Recognizing God in every individual Homines 
sapientes, especially in the smallest and weakest among them, force us to realize that 
when we care for a small baby or the sick, the handicapped, or the elderly, we care for 
God. 
This idea is central to Christian theology; one has only to recall the story of the 
Judgement from St. Matthew's Gospel: 
"Then the righteous will answer him, 'Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry 
and gave you food, or thirsty and gave you something to drink? And when was it 
that we saw you a stranger and welcomed you, or naked and gave you clothing? 
And when was it that we saw you sick or in prison and visited you?' And the king 
will answer them, 'Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these 
who are my brothers, you did it to me. " Matthew 25:37-40 (NRSV) 
This means that through our care and compassion, we allow God to flourish, and provide 
God with further opportunities to extend His love as we care for the smallest and most 
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helpless forms He takes before us. However, if we fail to care for the most vulnerable 
members of our family and species, and live only for ourselves, we deny God 
opportunities to live in the world. 
Roman Catholics should note the care and reverence their priests wield when 
handling the Eucharist, the bread which they transform into the body of Jesus 
Christ.242 Thin and fragile, the Body of Christ in this form is easily broken, and could 
never withstand long exposure to the elements. Because both the Eucharist, as it is Jesus 
Himself, and the Family Homo sapiens are human beings, and because both are 
vulnerable to the elements of the world, both require (and are in turn capable of 
providing) the necessary protection, love, and attention for the preservation of each. One 
finds its protection in the building of the church, the other finds its protection in its home 
and family. 
5.5. A Final Summary. To conclude at last, I wish simply to state the following points 
reached as a result of this investigation. These points not only demonstrate how human 
beings are unique, but also summarize the implications of that uniqueness. 
First, it is possible to describe the entire animal species, Homo sapiens, as human. 
This is because the surviving members of this species bear an ontological difference that 
sets them apart from other animal species. The presence of this ontological difference, a 
divine substance which Genesis refers to as the breath of God, means that the members of 
the Family Homo sapiens are not and have never been wholly products of evolution. 
Catechism of the Catholic Church. (Ottawa: Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops) 1378. 
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They bear the life of God within themselves. Through the Family Homo sapiens, God 
comes to live in the world. 
Second, it has been shown that human beings are both animal and divine. Each 
aspect of the human creature lies in the domain of a separate discipline of study. The 
body and the animal nature of the human being may be studied and explained with the 
help of biological science, but the divine spiritual aspect of the human being can only be 
known and understood through theological knowledge. At a certain point in time, 
theology tells us, a divine substance took root in the animal bodies of Homines sapientes, 
a gift from God that allowed them to exist in His image. 
Third, it has been shown that while attributes and abilities possessed by most 
human beings, such as language, symbolic communication, and ritual behavior, seem to 
set them apart, none of these can be used on its own to prove the uniqueness of the 
human creature. This is because both language and symbolic communication have been 
demonstrated to exist in other forms of animal life, and because not all human Homines 
sapientes demonstrate an ability to use rituals or to behave religiously (the autistic or the 
mentally handicapped, for example). Ultimately, the spiritual substance responsible for 
Homo sapiens' humanity is a non-empirical reality, and as a result cannot be 
scientifically proven. 
Fourth, though it does not allow for definitive proof of the species' humanity, 
religious behavior and rituals nevertheless serve as signs testifying to the presence of 
divine life in Homo sapiens. This is because a capacity for religious behavior and 
experience allows for humanity to establish communication with God. 
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Fifth, if we understand God to be loving and relational, then we can understand 
earthly humanity to exist in the image of God through its ability to have loving 
relationships with God and with itself. Human beings imitate God by loving one another 
and by together loving God. Those who are ill or handicapped, who are not capable of 
extending the love of God to others, are nevertheless both deserving and in need of the 
love and care of others, for they nevertheless carry the life of God within themselves. 
Sixth, as a result of this, God comes into the world profoundly vulnerable and in 
need of care. While God as the Creator of the Universe is all-powerful, God as a creature 
in the universe is powerless. If God is to survive in the world, then He will do so at the 
mercy of His creatures and His creation. 
Seventh, when we feed the hungry, comfort the lonely, or care for the poor, the 
sick, or the helpless, we do all these things for God. As God created us because He loves 
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